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I. INTRODUCTION
More than two decades have passed since then-Professor (now Jus-
tice) Stephen Breyer published Regulation and Its Reform,1 a mani-
festo challenging regulators to avoid "regulatory mismatch" by
narrowly tailoring regulatory mechanisms to respond to particular
market failures. Professor Breyer began by positing "a simple axiom
for creating and implementing any [regulatory] program: determine
the objectives, examine the alternative methods of obtaining the objec-
tives, and choose the best method for doing so."2 The best method,
Breyer asserted, will generally be the "least restrictive alternative"-
that is, the regulatory intervention that preserves the greatest degree
of contractual freedom consistent with elimination of the particular
market failure at issue. 3
1. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Breyer explains:
[C]lassical regulation ought to be looked upon as a weapon of last resort.
The problems accompanying classical regulation would seem sufficiently
serious to warrant adopting a "least restrictive alternative" approach to
regulation. Such an approach would view regulation through a procom-
petitive lens. It would urge reliance on an unregulated market in the
absence of a significant market defect. Then, when the harm produced
by the unregulated market is serious, it would suggest first examining
incentive-based intervention, such as taxes or marketable rights, or dis-
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Regulatory mismatch occurs when the government adopts a regu-
lation that is too broad (or perhaps too narrow) to provide a tailored fit
to the problem it is supposed to correct. For example, if the market
failure is information asymmetry - a substantial discrepancy between
the knowledge possessed by the seller of a good and that possessed by
prospective buyers - the government generally should not respond by
banning the sale of the item at issue. Such a rule would be overly
proscriptive and would thwart transactions whose total benefits ex-
ceed their total costs. 4 A more narrowly tailored rule would address
the informational problem directly by requiring sellers to provide per-
tinent information to prospective buyers before selling the good.5
In the last two decades, policymakers have undoubtedly
progressed along the lines Professor Breyer suggested. A number of
regulatory innovations display a sensitivity toward eliminating mar-
ket failures using the least restrictive means possible. In the environ-
mental arena, for example, policymakers have moved away from
stringent command-and-control, "end-of-pipe" regulations toward
more flexible pollution control strategies that employ pollution taxes 6
and marketable emissions credits 7 to achieve the same level of pollu-
closure regulation, bargaining, or other less restrictive forms of interven-
tions before turning to classical regulation itself. It would urge the
adoption of classical regulatory methods only where less restrictive
methods will not work.
Id. at 185; see also Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches,
Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 549, 586 (1979)
("[T]he focus on problems accompanying classical regulation supports the notion
of looking at economic regulation through a pro-competitive lens and adopting a
'least restrictive alternative' approach.").
4. See infra note 106 (discussing how increased restrictiveness increases costs by
eliminating gains from trade).
5. Indeed, this is the regulatory model upon which the federal securities laws are
based. The New Deal Congress rejected a "merit review model," which would
have prohibited outright the sale of overly risky securities, in favor of an ap-
proach that allowed issuers to sell very risky securities, provided they gave buy-
ers enough information to make an informed investment decision. See STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAw AND ECONOMICS 17 (2002).
6. Pollution taxes have been used extensively internationally. See Richard L. Ottin-
ger and Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32 ENVTL.
L. 331, 347 (2002). In the United States, they have been employed primarily for
municipal solid waste collection. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER'S GUIDE 119-21 (1995). For a discussion
of why emissions taxes are superior to more rigid pollution standards, see Rudy
Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the
Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1024 (1998).
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994) (provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments permitting the sale of tradeable permits to emit sulfur dioxide).
For discussions of the sulfur dioxide trading program, see Brian L. Ferrall, Note,
Will a Market in Sulfur Dioxide Work?: An Evaluation of the Acid Deposition Title
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 11 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 309, 320-28 (1992);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Note, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act:
1008 [Vol. 82:1006
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tion control in a more flexible, cost-effective manner. In securities reg-
ulation, policymakers have correctly recognized that information
asymmetry, the market failure justifying regulation of the sale of se-
curities, can be alleviated by less restrictive means than once thought
and have increasingly permitted securities sellers to opt-out of costly
disclosure rules as long as they provide enough information to remedy
the market failure.8 Even in the area of workplace safety, the subject
of this Article, policymakers have demonstrated some appreciation for
the value of narrowly tailoring regulations: the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration's ("OSHA's") Hazard Communication
Standard9 focuses on informing employees of chemical risks in the
workplace, rather than on banning such risks, for, as discussed be-
low,1O the primary market failure with respect to hazardous sub-
stances in the workplace is inadequate information."1
But the regulatory sophistication evident in OSHA's Hazard Com-
munication Standard is something of an anomaly for the agency. In
general, OSHA continues to address workplace safety hazards the old-
fashioned way: by imposing technological standards that employers
must, under threat of sanctions, implement. For example, OSHA's re-
cently adopted (but quickly repealed) ergonomics standard,12 would
have required employers to adopt a series of costly precautions in or-
A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 352
(1999).
8. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing integrated disclosure system for
securities); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings,
1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (noting that the extent of market failure in the
securities context is receding as a result of investor informational demands and
that the disclosure obligations under the securities laws are, appropriately, be-
coming more flexible as they are tailored to account for the market failure).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1999).
10. See infra subsection II.B.2.
11. Under the Hazard Communication Standard, chemical producers and importers
must evaluate the hazards of the chemicals they produce or import; develop tech-
nical hazard information for materials safety data sheets and for hazardous sub-
stance labels; and, most importantly, convey this information to employees who
use the relevant substances. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Dis-
closure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 654, 661 (1993) (describ-
ing Hazard Communication Standard).
12. 64 Fed. Reg. 65768 (Nov. 23, 1999). The ergonomics standard was adopted on
January 16, 2001, at the very end of the Clinton Administration. Congress
quickly passed legislation repealing the rule, which would have gone into effect in
October 2001, and President Bush signed the repeal into law on March 20, 2001.
President Bush's OSHA is currently drafting a new ergonomics proposal. See
Mike Allen, Bush Signs Repeal of Ergonomics Rules; Administration Promises
Business-Friendly Workplace Safety Regulations, WASH. POST, March 21, 2001, at
A6.
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der to eliminate workplace injuries resulting from awkward and/or re-
peated motions. 13
OSHA's standard regulatory approach-mandating particular risk
reduction technologies-is subject to the various maladies that typi-
cally beset command-and-control regulatory regimes. As discussed
more fully below, a regulatory approach based on mandating risk-re-
duction technologies: (1) thwarts gains from trade, and thus destroys
wealth, by precluding voluntary transactions in which less risk-averse
employees agree to work (in exchange for a risk premium) for employ-
ers for whom risk reduction is particularly costly;14 (2) fails to enlist
workers in accident-avoidance, even in circumstances in which the
workers are the cheaper injury-avoiders;15 (3) requires tremendous
amounts of time- and space-specific information, to which centralized
regulators likely are not privy;16 (4) creates disincentives to the devel-
opment of more effective or cheaper risk-reduction technologies; 17 and
(5) encourages inefficient interest-group maneuvering, whereby in-
cumbent firms seek to create barriers to entry by procuring regula-
tions requiring new entrants to adopt the safety measures utilized by
incumbents.18
These difficulties undoubtedly contribute to OSHA's notorious
cost-ineffectiveness. As of 1995, the estimated total cost of OSHA's
mandatory health and safety standards was $11 billion per year. 19
According to OSHA's most optimistic benefits figures, which a number
of scholars have disputed,20 the value of benefits produced by OSHA's
standards totaled only $3.6 billion per year-a mere third of the cost
of the mandatory standards. 2 1 In terms of workplace fatality rates,
there is little evidence OSHA's costly efforts have accomplished any-
13. See generally Thomas Lambert, Avoiding "Regulatory Mismatch" in Regulating
Workplace Ergonomics: The Case for an Informational Approach, 22 J. LABOR
RESEARCH 117 (2001) (discussing in detail the requirements of OSHA's proposed
ergonomics rule).
14. See infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
19. See Thomas J. Kneiser and John D. Leeth, Abolishing OSHA, 4 REGULATION 46,
50 (1995); see also Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. REG. 233, 275-76 (1991) (estimating
the costs of all employee safety regulations to be around $8.5 billion in 1985
dollars).
20. See Hahn & Hird, supra note 19, 8 YALE J. REG. at 275-76; W. KIP Viscusi, RISK
By CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 35 (1983) (con-
cluding that reviewed data showed that "OSHA inspections or penalties have had
no significant effect on worker injuries or illnesses"); LESTER LAVE, THE STRATEGY
OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 102 (1981) (conclud-
ing that OSHA regulations have had no positive effects).
21. See Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19, at 51.
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thing. Such rates have exhibited a downward trend, fueled in large
part by improvements in safety technology and changes in the occupa-
tional distribution of labor, since well before OSHA's establishment in
1970.22 In fact, the pre-OSHA drop in the frequency of workplace fa-
talities from 1947 to 1970 was 70 per cent larger than the post-OSHA
drop from 1970 to 1993.23 In terms of workplace injuries, the most
optimistic studies conclude that OSHA's abatement efforts have re-
duced injuries by at most 4.6 per cent per year, but that figure as-
sumes that OSHA's inspections have a significant abatement and
deterrence effect, and most studies dispute that assumption.24
Given OSHA's poor track record and the high costs of its command-
and-control approach, efficiency-minded regulators and legislators
should query whether the agency's focus on mandating particular risk
reduction technologies amounts to regulatory mismatch.2 5 The
agency's command-and-control approach might be appropriate if the
market failure leading to sub-optimal safety precautions in the work-
place were an externality. 26 As explained herein, however, employers
ultimately bear the costs of safety risks in the workplace,27 so there is
no genuine externality requiring a command-and-control fix.28 To the
extent employers are failing to take cost-effective precautions to re-
22. Id. at 48-49.
23. Id. at 49.
24. Id. at 50.
25. In many cases, the command-and-control regulations OSHA regulators have
adopted are required by legislation. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2002) (requiring pro-
mulgation of safety standards); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Politi-
cal Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 12 (1994) (noting that
"the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 . . . is a classic command-and-
control regulatory statute"). Thus, this Article does not intend to suggest that
regulators bear all the blame for the regulatory mismatch that currently exists in
the workplace safety arena. To the extent workplace safety statutes require the
command-and-control course OSHA has charted, those statutes should be
amended to permit the agency to focus more narrowly on remedying the precise
market failure at issue.
26. Though, as noted, there are less restrictive means than command-and-control for
regulating externalities. See supra notes 6 to 7 and accompanying text.
27. See supra subsection II.B.1.
28. With respect to ergonomic risks, the category of risks OSHA most recently sought
to regulate using a command-and-control approach, the agency has frankly ad-
mitted that employers are the ultimate cost-bearers. In a section of its proposed
ergonomics regulation ironically entitled "The Need for an Ergonomics Stan-
dard," the agency noted that in 1997, ergonomic injuries caused employees to
miss a total of 626,000 workdays and accounted for $1 of every $3 spent for work-
ers' compensation. 64 Fed. Reg. 65769 (Nov. 23, 1999). OSHA then estimated
that employers pay between $15 and $20 billion in workers compensation costs
for ergonomic injuries every year. Id. The proposed ergonomics standard, the
agency said, would have saved employers $9.1 billion per year. Id. at 66,002.
The agency never bothered to explain why, if employers are paying such a high
toll for ergonomic injuries, the government needs to force them to take cost-effec-
tive precautions to reduce such injuries.
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duce safety risks in their workplaces, the culprit market failure is
some sort of informational deficiency-inadequate information on the
part of employees about safety risks, inadequate information on the
part of employers about available precautions, or perhaps both.29 The
most narrowly tailored regulatory solution, then, would be some sort
of informational regulation that attempts to alleviate any deficiencies.
Or would it? While a number of regulatory theorists, reasoning
that employees will demand compensation for known risks and will
thereby motivate employers to take all cost-effective precautions to
eliminate those risks, have advocated risk-disclosure approaches to
workplace safety regulation,30 there may be good reasons to think
that the policies they have proposed will not work. First, insights re-
garding individuals' "bounded rationality" and evidence from the field
of behavioral economics suggests that individuals are subject to cogni-
tive limitations and biases that prevent them from digesting and accu-
rately processing risk information, 3 1 and a regulatory strategy that
focuses on providing employees with risk information may therefore
fail to achieve its objectives. 32 In addition, the informational strate-
gies that focus solely on informing employees of risks, as most so far
have done,3 3 may fail if the factor preventing employers from adopting
cost-effective safety precautions is not lack of motivation stemming
from employee ignorance of risks34 but is instead employer ignorance
of such precautions. Substantive safety standards provide employers
with information about potential cost-effective precautions of which
they might otherwise remain ignorant. Hence, OSHA's eschewal of an
information-provision approach in favor of substantive safety stan-
dards might make sense.
But before approving a command-and-control approach to work-
place safety (or rejecting such an approach as overly proscriptive), pol-
icy makers should explore the range of regulatory options that could
be used to address the problem of untaken cost-effective safety precau-
tions in the workplace. 35 The purpose of this Article is to do just that.
29. See infra subsection II.B.2.
30. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (citing theorists advocating risk disclo-
sure approach to workplace safety regulation).
31. See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 180 (citing sources arguing that individuals' bounded rationality
and cognitive quirks will disable a regulatory policy based on informing workers
of workplace safety risks).
33. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
34. As explained in greater detail below, see infra subsection II.B.2.a, employers will
lack motivation to take all cost-effective safety precautions if employees, ignorant
of the magnitude of workplace risks, are not demanding adequate "risk premi-
ums" to cover their expected injury costs.
35. As explained in greater detail below, see infra Section ILA, the goal of workplace
safety regulation, at least from an efficiency standpoint, should not be to elimi-
nate all safety risks, but only those whose elimination would be less costly than
1012 [Vol. 82:1006
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As it turns out, there is fertile middle ground between the pure liber-
tarian "do nothing" approach and the paternalistic command-and-con-
trol approach OSHA tends to favor. Even the middle ground
"information-provision" approach a number of theorists have advo-
cated (in imprecise terms) could be implemented several different
ways, some of which would be more effective than others. It is there-
fore possible to make some systematic policy prescriptions that may
aid regulators attempting to avoid regulatory mismatch.
In the course of exploring the range of regulatory options, this Arti-
cle attempts to make several contributions to the literature on work-
place safety regulation. First, it seeks to flesh out some concrete
policies aimed at providing workplace risk information to employees.
While a number of theorists have asserted generally that regulators
should focus on informing employees of workplace risks,36 no theorist
has offered a detailed proposal stating what information should be
provided and how it may be transferred cheaply. Next, the Article re-
sponds to behavioral theorists who argue that individuals' cognitive
limitations and biases necessarily render ineffective an information-
provision approach to workplace safety regulation. Thus far, the
behavioralists and the information-provision advocates have largely
talked around one another. This Article shows that, even if the
behavioralists are correct in their claims about individuals' abilities to
process risk information, an information-provision approach may be
effective. Finally, the Article demonstrates that the informational in-
adequacy comprising the market failure sometimes consists of more
than inadequate risk information on the part of employees; employers
also may face systematic informational deficiencies, and any informa-
tional approach should address those deficiencies as well. The Article
therefore attempts to provide some guidance as to when regulators
should provide information to employers as well as employees, and
how they may do so effectively.
Following Professor Breyer's "simple axiom for creating and imple-
menting any [regulatory] program" (i.e., "determine the objectives, ex-
amine the alternative methods of obtaining the objectives, and choose
the best method for doing so"),37 the Article proceeds as follows: Part
II defines the objectives of workplace safety regulation, first identify-
ing the socially undesirable "symptom" regulators should be address-
ing and then diagnosing the more fundamental market failure that is
the expected cost of the injuries they would cause. To state this more precisely, a
risk reduction measure should be taken if its marginal cost (i.e., the additional
cost of implementing it) is less than or equal to its marginal benefit (in terms of
the incremental injury costs it is likely to avert). Some workplace safety risks
cannot be cost-effectively eliminated and, from an efficiency standpoint, should
be permitted.
36. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
37. BREYER, supra note 1, at 5.
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responsible for that symptom. Part III then explores the regulatory
options for eliminating the culprit market failure, paying particular
attention to informational approaches to workplace safety regulation
and concluding that such approaches may sometimes require em-
ployer, as well as employee, education. In addition, Part III responds
to the apparent challenge behavioralism poses to an informational ap-
proach to workplace safety regulation.
II. DEFINING THE TASK
The general question with which an analysis of workplace safety
regulation should begin-what are the regulatory objectives?3S-
should be addressed on two levels. First, regulators should decide
how the current state of affairs differs from what the optimal state of
affairs would be: What "symptom" calls for a regulatory cure? Sec-
ond, what defect in the scheme of private ordering (i.e., what "market
failure")39 is leading to the undesirable symptom? The first question
concerns effects; the second attempts to diagnose the cause of those
effects.
A. The Symptom: Sub-Optimal Precaution-Taking by
Employers
The existence of workplace risk in general is not the symptom reg-
ulators should attempt to alleviate, for some degree of safety risk nec-
essarily accompanies productive activity, and the only way to
eliminate all risk would be to eliminate all productive activity. But
regulation should undoubtedly aim to reduce some risks-at least
very grave ones that are not necessary to achieve productive gains.
Thus, the question is, "Where is the stopping point?" What level of
risk reduction should regulators attempt to achieve if the two
endpoints-total risk reduction and zero risk reduction-are elimi-
nated? Economics provides an answer to that question.
Because risk reduction generally exhibits increasing marginal
costs and decreasing marginal benefits (see Figure A),40 the efficient
38. Recall Professor Breyer's "simple axiom" for avoiding regulatory mismatch: "de-
termine the objectives, examine the alternative methods of attaining the objec-
tives, and choose the best method for doing so." BREYER, supra note 1, at 5.
39. "Market failure" means simply "a failure of market transactions in the real world
to live up to the idealized assumptions hypothesized by economists," under which
"the unconstrained choices of consumers, coupled with the provision of goods in
the marketplace by competitive firms, lead to efficient outcomes as consumers
select the bundle of goods they most prefer." W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to
Extend the Boundaries of Consumer Sovereignty, 23 HLv. J. L. & Pus. POL'Y 211,
212 (1999).
40. This means that as more and more risks are reduced, the incremental cost of
eliminating each additional risk increases, and the incremental benefit of reduc-
ing the risk diminishes.
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point of risk reduction-that level of risk reduction that maximizes
societal wealth-occurs where the marginal cost of reducing a risk
equals the marginal benefit of the risk reduction (point X). 4 1 Reducing
risks beyond this point (e.g., continuing to reduce risks to point z) is
inefficient because each additional unit of risk reduction costs more
than it provides in benefits. Conversely, failure to reduce risks up to
this point (e.g., stopping risk reduction at point y) is inefficient be-
cause continued risk reduction would cost less than the sum of bene-
fits it would produce. Hence, the goal of workplace safety regulation
should be to ensure that employers take all, but only, those risk-reduc-
tion measures whose marginal benefits, in terms of risk reduction, are
greater than or equal to their marginal costs. The "symptom" regula-
tors should address, then, is employers' failure to do so. Put differ-
ently, the symptom is inefficient risk, or risk that could be eliminated
cost-effectively.
B. The Market Failure: Systematic Informational
Inadequacy
Having determined the symptom to be addressed, regulators
should turn their attention to diagnosis by attempting to pinpoint the
defect in the free market that prevents employers from taking all cost-
effective safety precautions to protect their employees from workplace
injuries and illnesses. That market failure is not a negative external-
ity, the market failure most frequently redressed through the sort of
command-and-control approach OSHA typically employs, but is in-
stead an informational inadequacy caused by the positive externali-
ties exhibited by risk and precaution information.
1. Not a Negative Externality
Negative externalities-costs that are borne by individuals who
have no control over (i.e., are "external" to) the decision to create the
costs-are a frequently cited form of market failure and are often used
to justify government regulation.42 When some costs of a decision ac-
crue to individuals other than the decisionmaker, that person is likely
to make an inefficient decision that he would not make if he bore the
full costs and benefits of his decisions.43 Hence, theorists have long
41. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 56 (1984).
42. See, e.g., A.C. Piaou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-94 (1920).
43. As noted above, see supra Section II.A, the optimal amount of an activity occurs
where the total marginal cost of the activity (which tends to rise with increases in
the activity) equals the total marginal benefit of the activity (which tends to fall
with increases in the level of activity). If the individual in charge of setting the
activity level does not bear the full marginal costs or benefits of the activity, he
will engage in an in-optimal amount of the activity. An actor who does not bear
2004] 1015
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argued that government intervention is necessary when there is a
negative externality:44 the government may tax the externality-creat-
ing process so that the decisionmaker faces personal costs more closely
aligned with the total costs his actions are creating,4 5 or, if taxation is
impracticable, it may simply ban the activity or command that it occur
at a particular rate. Environmental laws provide perhaps the best ex-
ample of government intervention to address negative externalities:
Because factory owners foist smokes, smells, and health risks on their
neighbors and thus do not bear the full costs of their production
processes, the government intervenes either by taxing the polluting
activity46 or directly commanding the factory owner to reduce pollu-
tion to a particular point.4 7 Absent government intervention (or well-
defined, transferable property rights and the ability to bargain
cheaply),48 the factory owner would engage in a socially in-optimal
(i.e., excessive) amount of polluting activity.4 9
To be sure, employees are adversely affected by employers' deci-
sions to underinvest in safety precautions, and one might thus say
the full marginal costs of his activity will engage in too high a level of that activ-
ity, and one who cannot capture the full marginal benefits of his activity will
under-engage in the activity. Figure C, infra, graphically depicts this latter phe-
nomenon with respect to information production efforts.
44. See PIGoU, supra note 42, at 195 ("No 'invisible hand' can be relied on to produce
a good arrangement of the whole from a combination of separate treatment of the
parts. It is therefore necessary that an authority of wider reach should intervene
and should tackle the collective problems of beauty, of air, and of light .... "). As
Professor Ronald Coase pointed out in his famous article, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960), the existence of negative externalities does not neces-
sarily require government intervention. Coase demonstrated that inefficiencies
stemming from negative externalities could be (and would be) resolved through
private negotiations if property rights were clear and the costs of reaching and
enforcing agreements were trivial. For example, if a factory owner could
costlessly negotiate with his neighbors, the negotiating parties would eventually
end up selecting the more efficient outcome between permitting the pollution and
banning it, regardless of whether the factory owner were initially given the right
to pollute or the neighbors the right to be free from pollution. Government inter-
vention to control externalities, then, is desirable only when it is cheaper than
the costs of private bargaining and contracting. As it turns out, that may fre-
quently be the case.
45. PIGOU, supra note 42, at 194-96.
46. See generally Howard Gensler, The Economics of Pollution Taxes, 10 J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (1994-95) (stating economic case for pollution taxes).
47. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002) (Clean Water Act provision providing for precise
effluent limitations). Note that even marketable emissions credits, which are
generally thought of as a "free market" innovation, ultimately amount to a gov-
ernmental command to reduce the total pollution level to a particular point (i.e.,
the point that will be reached when all available permits are exercised). See gen-
erally Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20 COLO. LAWYER 435,
438 (1991) (discussing the marketable permit model).
48. See supra note 44 (discussing Coase theorem).
49. See Piaou, supra note 42, at 195.
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that negative externalities result from employers' decisions not to
adopt particular safety measures. But not every instance of spillover
costs counts as the type of negative externality for which a govern-
ment correction is necessary or desirable. Economists draw a distinc-
tion between "technological" and "pecuniary" externalities: Pecuniary
externalities are mitigated by the price mechanism, while technologi-
cal externalities are not.50 So, for example, if one chooses to neglect
maintenance on an automobile she plans to resell, there is a negative
externality (the new buyer will undoubtedly be affected by the owner's
decision to neglect her car), but the externality is wholly pecuniary, for
the owner's negligence will be reflected in the price she is able to com-
mand for the car. By contrast, there is no mitigating price mechanism
when a factory dumps smoke on its neighbors; the externality at issue
is technological. 5 1 Market failure occurs, and thus the efficiency argu-
ments for government intervention apply, only where the externalities
at issue are technological. 5 2 Pecuniary externalities are not ineffi-
cient, because the price mechanism ensures that prices equal margi-
nal cost and that the cost-creator is penalized by an appropriately
sized reduction in the price he can command for whatever it is he is
selling.53
Those who would argue that government regulation of workplace
safety is necessary to correct for the "externality" inherent in the fact
that it is employees who pay for employers' safety gambles 54 err in
50. See, e.g., David Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701, 723 (1987). Haddock et al. explain:
"Externality" is a slippery concept, one less often used to elucidate a sup-
posed "problem" than to justify government intervention to "solve" it.
The efficiency issue is not whether any third-party impact takes place-
that is inevitable-but whether the appropriate marginal conditions still
hold. Many externalities are solely pecuniary; they change prices but do
not raise efficiency concerns as long as prices still equal marginal cost. A
problem arises only when prices and costs diverge, creating a non-pecu-
niary (or "technological") externality.
Id.
51. In general, third-party effects that occur within a contractual context (i.e., where
the cost-creator and cost-bearer are parties to a bargain) will be pecuniary exter-
nalities; those that occur in a tort context (i.e., where the cost-bearer is unable to
engage in ex ante bargaining with the cost-creator) will be technological.
52. See Haddock et al., supra note 50, at 723.
53. See id.
54. Professor Sidney Shapiro has succinctly summarized the (unsound) externality
argument in favor of workplace safety regulation:
[WIorkplace injuries and illnesses are called "externalities" or "spillover"
costs, for the reason the following hypothetical demonstrates. Assume
that workers are exposed to fumes in a factory that are dangerous to
their health. In an unregulated labor market, i.e., one without workers'
compensation or OSHA, the factory would appear to have no incentive to
reduce the pollution, which would have the effect of reducing its profit.
A portion of the cost of production-the workers' illnesses-therefore
"spills over" to the employees in the sense that they, not the factory, will
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ignoring the fact that the externalities at issue in the workplace safety
context are pecuniary externalities, or externalities that are "internal-
ized" to the employer via the price mechanism. To see this point, con-
sider the elements that comprise the price employers pay for workers.
That price can be divided into at least three components. Most obvi-
ously, it includes wages. In addition, it includes the monetary value of
benefits (e.g., vacation time, pension contributions, various perqui-
sites) as well as the expected value of injury compensation the em-
ployer will pay. This last element is equal to the amount of
compensation that would be provided for each possible injury times
the likelihood that each such injury will occur. 55 Two of the elements
of worker price-expected injury compensation and wages-are di-
rectly affected by the riskiness of the worker's job: as the risks of a job
increase, those elements of worker price will rise, leading to internal-
ization. Consider each in turn.
a. Workers' Compensation: Ex Post Compensation for Risk-
Bearing
Workers' compensation laws, which have been adopted by every
state, 56 impose strict liability on employers for all on-the-job injuries,
thereby ensuring that employers bear the costs of safety risks at
work.57 By forcing employers to pay for on-the-job injuries, workers'
compensation laws theoretically motivate employers to take all cost-
effective precautions to reduce job-related injuries. That is because
requiring employers to pay, ex post, for on-the-job accidents gives
them an incentive, ex ante, to continue taking preventive measures up
to the point at which the (increasing) marginal cost of adopting an
additional precautionary measure equals the (decreasing) marginal
pay for the consequences of becoming ill. Put another way, these costs
are "external" to the factory. A market with an externality or spillover
cost does not operate in an "efficient" manner. There is a market failure
because the price of the product made by the factory does not reflect the
costs paid by the workers concerning their illnesses. The underpricing of
the product leads to overproduction. Because the price is lower than it
would be if the factory paid for the spillover cost, consumers will
purchase more of it than otherwise. The market is not efficient because
more of the product is sold than if it were properly priced.
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 22, 23
(1999).
55. Employers who carry workers' compensation insurance pay regular premiums
that reflect the value of this benefit; those that self-insure only pay when an in-
jury occurs but will recognize the expected value of compensation payments as
part of the price that must be paid for an additional employee.
56. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION DESK
EDITION § 2.08, at 2-16; CARL GERSUNY, WORK HAZARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CON-
FLICT 54 (1981).
57. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 539 (2d ed. 1999).
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benefit, in terms of decreased accident costs, the measure will
produce.5 8
On its own, however, workers' compensation does not sufficiently
internalize all costs of workplace risks. Theorists have identified at
least four categories of "leaks" that lead to workplace injury costs not
being fully borne by the employer. 59 First, there are leaks resulting
from imperfect insurance pricing. To the extent there is a divergence
between true injury costs and insurance premiums, as there generally
will be, the costs of workplace risks will not be completely internal-
ized. 60 Next, even if employers end up paying all direct injury costs,
litigating and adjudicating workers' compensation claims in order to
achieve cost-shifting is itself costly, and those costs are not generally
borne by employers.6 1 Third, leaks may occur as a result of the vari-
58. See infra Figure A.
59. See generally Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox
and Workers' Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 142-81 (1992) (evaluating
obstacles to internalization).
60. See id. at 142-55 (1992). Most employers subject to workers' compensation re-
quirements carry some type of workers' compensation insurance. For those em-
ployers, internalization occurs through the insurance premiums they must pay.
Internalization will be imperfect if the insurance premiums are not "actuarily
fair," or, in other words, equal to the discounted expected value of the claim
against the insurer (plus a premium for bearing the risk). There are a number of
reasons insurance prices may not actually reflect costs. First, there are practical
barriers. It is costly for insurance companies to determine with accuracy what
the discounted expected value of an insured's annual claims will be. Some means
of estimating this figure-such as looking at the average for the last five years,
checking to see if changes in operations have occurred that would make the aver-
age unrepresentative, and adjusting the estimation to account for those
changes-are more likely to produce accurate estimates than are others-such as
just looking at last year's experience. With increasing accuracy, however, come
higher transactions costs, and insurance firms thus will not always adopt the
most accurate means of prognostication. To the extent that estimated costs, and
thus insurance prices, diverge from actual costs, there may be externalization.
See id. at 143-49, 153-55.
Legal and regulatory constraints may also lead to a divergence between costs
and prices, and thus to externalization. For example, private insurance bans,
adopted by a number of states, eliminate the competition among insurers that
pushes prices in line with costs. Id. at 151. Similarly, minimum capital require-
ments present a barrier to entry and therefore restrict competition, eliminating
some of the pressure that drives price toward cost in each line of insurance. Id.
In addition, excess profits statutes, which often define the capped rate of return
as the return on capital, motivate insurers to use capital-intensive methods of
operation. To the extent these are not cost-minimizing, the overall operating
costs of regulated firms will be higher. These costs, then, will be passed on to
insured employers in the form of higher prices and may thus widen that portion
of the wedge between price and cost that is attributable to administrative costs.
Id. at 152.
61. The costliness of litigation leads to three types of externalization. First, some
claims are dropped, never filed, or settled for less than full compensation because
the anticipated award is less than the anticipated litigation cost. In such cases,
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ous funds that numerous states have established to supplement work-
ers' compensation awards to particular classes of injured victims. 62
These funds may lead to externalization for two reasons: First, al-
though the special funds are funded by employers whose employees
are potential beneficiaries, the employers' required payments will not
generally match the discounted expected value that will be paid to
their employees (so that, as with imperfect insurance pricing, there is
a divergence between the costs employers impose and the price they
must pay).6 3 Moreover, all administrative costs attached to the distri-
bution of benefits from special funds are carried by the state, not by
the employers imposing the risks.64 Finally, externalization may oc-
cur because of the systematic undercompensation and undervaluation
of injuries. Undercompensation occurs because state workers' com-
pensation laws generally impose damages caps and deem some genu-
ine losses, such as pain and suffering, non-compensable. 6 5 Moreover,
compensation awards may undervalue real losses because of infla-
tion 66 and offsets that permit the employer to deduct from awards any
amounts the injured employee receives from other specified sources,
such as the Social Security Disability Insurance Fund.67
the employee's loss is not fully shifted to the employer. Second, the litigation
costs of plaintiffs who pursue challenged claims are not generally shifted to the
employer. When the claims are valid, such costs should be considered part of the
loss resulting from the original injury. Third, the administrative costs of litigat-
ing claims-i.e., the incremental costs of running the administrative machin-
ery-are externalized to the public. See id. at 162. Of course, requiring losing
defendants to pay all litigation and court costs could eliminate these last two
sources of externalization.
62. For example, such funds may: (1) provide for expenses associated with extended
hospital care, (2) support rehabilitation expenses, (3) provide cost-of-living ad-
justments to permanently disabled workers, (4) provide continuing benefits to
workers when an insurer (or a self-insuring employer) fails financially and can no
longer provide support, and (5) pay benefits to workers injured while employed in
high risk industries. See id. at 166 (citing Lloyd W. Larson & John F. Burton, Jr.,
Special Funds in Workers' Compensation, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS:
ADEQUACY, EQuITY, AND EFFICIENCY 117, 121-22 (John D. Worrall & David Appel,
eds. 1985)).
63. See Hylton & Laymon, supra note 59, at 167 ("[Tlhere is no guarantee that em-
ployers responsible for workers' injuries are actually being required to contribute
to the state funds.").
64. See id. at 169 ("[Slince the administrative costs of dispensing these benefits [from
special funds] often are carried by the state, these expenses-ordinarily
shouldered by insurers and passed on to employers through service fees-are
wholly externalized.").
65. See id. at 170-76.
66. Most states do not offer automatic cost-of-living adjustments to disability bene-
fits. See Larson & Burton, supra note 62, at 135-45. Thus, when inflation lowers
the real value of a disability payment, the employer is able to get by with paying
less than a compensatory amount. See Hylton & Laymon, supra note 59, at 176-
78.
67. See id. at 178-79.
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Given these sources of externalization in the workers' compensa-
tion system, employers do not fully pay ex post for the risks they per-
mit, and one might therefore conclude that there is a negative
externality rationale for workplace safety regulation. But economic
theory and empirical evidence suggest that the other adjustable ele-
ment of worker price, worker wages, works in tandem with workers'
compensation to ensure that leaks in the injury compensation scheme
do not create technological negative externalities that necessitate sub-
stantive safety standards.
b. Compensating Risk Differentials: Ex Ante Compensation
for Risk-Bearing
While workers' compensation requires employers to pay after an
injury occurs for the risks resulting from their decisions regarding
which safety precautions to adopt, employers must also pay up front
for such risks. Consistent with economists' well-established theory of
"compensating differentials,"68 an extensive, robust body of empirical
economic evidence indicates that employers must pay risk premiums
for exposing their employees to perceived risks.69 Moreover, the data
68. The theory of compensating differentials has persisted for literally centuries.
Stated in perhaps its earliest (and undoubtedly most famous) version, the theory
asserts that "[t]he whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
employments of labor and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either per-
fectly equal or tending to equality .... The wages of labor vary with the ease or
hardship, the honorableness or dishonorableness of employment." ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 99-100
(1776, reprinted 1937). Stated more simply, by its perhaps most vigorous con-
temporary adherent, the theory maintains that:
If a worker takes a job he knows is risky, there must be some other as-
pect to compensate for the risk. If the other nonmonetary aspects of the
job are equivalent to those for less risky jobs, this compensation will take
the form of a higher wage rate. The need to pay higher wages in turn
provides a financial incentive for the employer to reduce the risk.
Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 20, at 37.
69. See, e.g., Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence
from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265-98,
(Nester Terleckyj ed. 1976); W. Kip VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTI-
CATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979) (finding that workers on jobs perceived
as dangerous receive an earnings premium of 5.5%); Charles Brown, Equalizing
Differences in the Labor Market, 94 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 113 (1980) (reviewing
studies and providing fresh empirical data); W. Kip Viscusi, Occupational Safety
and Health Regulation: Its Impact and Policy Alternatives, in RESEARCH IN PUB-
LIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 281, 281-89 (John P. Crecine ed. 1981);
Richard J. Arnould & Len M. Nichols, Wage Risk Premiums and Workers' Com-
pensation: A Refinement of Estimates of Compensating Wage Differentials, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 332 (1983); Stuart Dorsey & Norman Walzer, Workers' Compensation,
Job Hazards, and Wages, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 642 (1983); Greg J. Duncan
& Bertil Holmlund, Was Adam Smith Right After All? Another Test of the Theory
of Compensating Wage Differentials, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 366, 374 (1983) (finding that
"[d] angerous work yields positive wage premiums of around 2%"); Gerking, et al.,
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show that even when a workers' compensation regime exists to pro-
vide ex post compensation, employers still must fill in the gaps (e.g.,
pain and suffering damages)70 left by workers' compensation by pro-
viding some ex ante risk compensation in the form of risk premiums. 7 1
Those premiums tend to diminish as the level of workers' compensa-
tion benefits increases and rise as workers' compensation falls. 72
The data thus suggest that workers' compensation and risk premi-
ums complement one another: they work together in tandem to pro-
vide injury compensation, so that where workers' compensation
benefits are relatively high, risk premiums will be relatively low, and
The Marginal Value of Job Safety: A Contingent Valuation Study, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 185 (1988); Henry W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan M. Schlottmann, Valuing
Risk in the Workplace: Market Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provi-
sion of Safety, 72 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 463 (1990) (listing, at 463, Ameri-
can, British, and Swedish studies documenting the existence of compensating
differentials and providing, at 468, new evidence indicating that compensating
differentials comprised 1.9% to 2.5% of manufacturing employees' weekly earn-
ings); Felice Martinello & Ronald Meng, Workplace Risks and the Value of Haz-
ard Avoidance, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 333, 343 (1992)(concluding that "Workers
are compensated for higher fatality risks" and "also receive additional wage pre-
miums for higher risks of total injuries and severe injuries"); Michael Moore & W.
Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using New Occupa-
tional Fatality Data, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGT. 476 (1988) (using then-new Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health data to recalculate the
implicit value of life revealed by compensating differentials for fatality risks);
MICHAEL MOORE & W. KP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS:
WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 46-52 (1990) (estimat-
ing risk premiums and the extent to which those premiums are lowered by the
presence of workers' compensation). But see Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom,
Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
116 (1998) (disputing existence of compensating differentials). Also note that em-
pirical evidence suggests that similar risk premiums are paid for objective (as
opposed to perceived) risks. See ViscusI, RISK By CHOICE, supra note 20, at 44.
70. Workers' compensation statutes generally render pain and suffering damages
non-compensable. See ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw
§ 1.03[4], 1-10 (2000).
71. See MOORE & VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 46-50 (esti-
mating the magnitude of compensating differentials that are paid in addition to
the income replacement provided by workers' compensation and concluding that
those differentials indicate that workers implicitly value the nonmonetary health
losses asgociated with workplace injuries at between $18,500 and $28,000 per lost
workday injury).
72. See id. at 23 (noting that the "two principal results" of wage equation studies are
that: (1) "increases in workers' compensation benefits decrease wages in a man-
ner consistent with the compensating differential model," and (2) "wage-risk dif-
ferentials would be much higher in the absence of workers' compensation, as
workers would demand more ex ante compensation for exposure to risk in the
absence of ex post guarantees"); id. at 51 ("Higher levels of workers' compensa-
tion lead to a reduction in the base wage level that workers are paid."); id. at 54
(noting regression results that "indicate a substantial tradeoff between the base
wage rate and workers' compensation benefits").
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vice-versa.7 3 Leaks in the workers' compensation regime, then, do not
permit employers to externalize the costs of workplace risks, for when
employees are aware of workplace risks and know that workers' com-
pensation will undercompensate for injuries that do occur, they will
demand additional salary or other benefits, thereby forcing employers
to pay for the risks workers' compensation does not cover. 74 The up-
shot is that employers cannot get out of paying for whatever level of
risk they permit in their workplaces. They pay either after injuries
occur (through workers' compensation) or up front (in the form of
higher wages).7 5 Hence, it does not appear that negative externalities
are to blame for employers' failure to take all cost-effective safety pre-
cautions to protect employees.
73. As Moore and Viscusi explain:
Wages and workers' compensation serve as complementary compensa-
tion mechanisms, with wages providing ex ante risk compensation and
workers' compensation providing ex post earnings replacement. Each of
these wage components reduces worker quitting, and workers accept a
lower wage in response to higher workers' compensation benefits. This
result reflects the tradeoff workers are willing to make between different
forms of risk compensation.
MOORE & VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 109-10.
74. Of course, the fact that employers must supplement workers' compensation with
risk premiums that inversely correlate with workers' compensation benefit levels
does not prove that the magnitude of risk premiums is sufficient to cover all the
leaks in workers' compensation. In other words, just because there are supple-
mental risk premiums does not mean that they are big enough to ensure full
internalization. Empirical evidence, however, does indicate that the risk premi-
ums paid in addition to workers' compensation's income replacement are fairly
large. Professors Moore and Viscusi documented supplemental risk premiums
(i.e., premiums paid in addition to workers' compensation benefits) large enough
to imply that workers were receiving compensation of $18,500 to $28,000 per lost
workday injury for the non-monetary (i.e., uncovered) aspects of the injury. See
MOORE & VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 49. In fact, the
compensation for the non-monetary aspects of injury loss, which came in the form
ofex ante risk premiums, exceeded the compensation for income loss, which came
in the form of workers' compensation. See id. ("The findings here imply that at
least half of current implicit valuations of injuries represent implicit values of the
nonmonetary aspects of injuries."). Given the magnitude of risk premiums, one
might safely assume that the premiums, taken together with the risk compensa-
tion provided by workers' compensation, provide full or nearly full compensation
for workplace safety risks so that employers are not creating a significant techno-
logical externality by permitting such risks.
75. Indeed, employers pay a lot for exposing employees to risk: In 1993, firms paid
$55 million for workers' compensation and an estimated $200 billion for compen-
sating wage differentials to workers for accepting job hazards. See Kneiser &
Leeth, supra note 19, at 55. By contrast, OSHA and corresponding state agencies
assessed fines of only $160 million that year. Id. Thus, the incentive effects of




2. Systematically Inadequate Information
Negative externalities, however, do not constitute the only form of
market failure that might justify government regulation of workplace
safety.7 6 Even if employers ultimately pay for perceived workplace
risks through workers' compensation and employee-demanded risk
premiums, they will still fail to implement all cost-effective safety pre-
cautions if either: (1) employees are systematically uninformed of
workplace safety risks and thus fail to demand adequate compensat-
ing differentials, or (2) employers are, for some reason, systematically
uninformed of available cost-effective safety precautions. As the fol-
lowing paragraphs demonstrate, systematic underproduction of risk
and precaution information may prevent employers from taking all
cost-effective safety precautions and may therefore justify some form
of government regulation of workplace safety.
a. Employees' Informational Deficiency
In order for employees to demand adequate risk premiums so that
employers end up bearing the full costs of the risks they impose and
thus have an incentive to take all cost-effective safety precautions, a
sufficient number of employees must be aware of the relative risk a job
presents.7 7 On their own, however, employees are unlikely to gener-
ate the socially optimal amount of information about workplace safety
risks. Moreover, neither employers nor third-parties are likely to pro-
vide employees with an optimal amount of such information. Thus,
absent government intervention, employees will likely remain system-
atically underinformed of workplace safety risks and will therefore fail
to demand the risk premiums that motivate efficient precaution-tak-
ing on the part of employers.
(1) Employee Efforts Insufficient
Information about workplace risks undoubtedly benefits prospec-
tive employees, and one would therefore expect prospective employees
76. Welfare economics traditionally recognizes four other general sources of market
failure: (1) positive externalities, (2) information asymmetry between producer
and consumer, (3) the good to be produced is a public good, and (4) producer mo-
nopoly. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 424.
77. As demonstrated below, see infra notes 125 to 130, 209 to 211, and accompanying
text, not every employee must be aware ofjob risks for the market wage to reflect
those risks. As long as a sufficient number of mobile employees know of the risks
and employers are unable to engage in wage discrimination, the market wage
will include an accurate risk premium. See Henry N. Butler & Keith W. Chauvin,
Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A Framework for Analyzing Employment
Law Issues, 8 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1999) (explaining that "the market can
work even if most workers are neither highly mobile nor fully informed of all




to invest in discovering the risks presented by the various jobs they
are considering. In most cases, however, employee production of infor-
mation regarding the relative risk of a workplace will be impractica-
ble, for prospective employees are not privy to, and cannot easily
obtain, the accident and injury data necessary to determine the rela-
tive safety risks presented at a workplace.78 By contrast, such data
generally are available to employers. Accordingly, there is an infor-
mation asymmetry between producers and consumers: Job "produc-
ers" (employers) are privy to important information that is
inaccessible to job "consumers" (employees). 79 Absent some kind of
mandatory disclosure regime, employees are unlikely to be able to
generate significant information about the relative safety risks of
jobs.80
Even if employees are able to gather the data necessary to produce
information about the relative risks of a workplace, they are unlikely
to produce a socially optimal amount of such information because the
information exhibits positive externalities-i.e., benefits not captured
by the producer.8 ' Unable to appropriate the full benefits of their ef-
forts to produce information about workplace safety risks, individual
employees will produce such information only if their private benefits
from doing so exceed the costs of production. In many cases, produc-
ing relative risk information would be efficient from a societal stand-
point (i.e., the total benefits of the information would exceed the costs
of producing it), but, because many of the benefits are externalized,
would not be in the interest of any individual employee.8 2
An example clarifies this point. Suppose that the cost of producing
information about the relative riskiness of a job is $50 and that,
armed with such information, a prospective employee could convince
his employer to pay an additional risk premium that would be suffi-
cient to cover the expected injury cost not covered by workers' compen-
78. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Ad-
ministrative Law, 98 YALE L. J. 341, 355 (1988) ("Knowing that they must com-
pensate workers to take risks, employers would like to keep job hazards secret.").
79. See Michael Abramowicz, Market-Based Administrative Enforcement, 15 YALE J.
REG. 197, 259 n.184 (1998) (noting information asymmetry). Information asym-
metry between producers and consumers is a traditionally recognized source of
market failure. See supra note 76.
80. For reasons discussed below, see infra notes 85 to 89 and accompanying text, em-
ployers are unlikely to voluntarily disclose information about the safety risks at
their workplaces.
81. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RiSK AND REASON 255 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Television
and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 534 (2000) (discussing the positive
externalities associated with information and its consequent tendency to be un-
derproduced privately). Note that positive externalities are another of the tradi-
tionally recognized forms of market failure. See supra note 76.




sation-say, $30. That $30 risk premium would equal the product of
the present value of the non-compensable part of an injury (say,
$3,000) times the likelihood of injury (1/100). If the employer had ten
employees and wage discrimination was impracticable, she would
have to pay an additional $300 ($30 x 10) because of the employee's
information-production efforts. Assume, then, that the employer
could eliminate the risk, and could therefore forego the $300 in com-
pensating differentials, by taking a precaution that would cost $150 to
implement. She would do so, and society would be better off by $150.
That is because the sum of precaution costs and expected injury costs
prior to the employee's information-production efforts ($0 + $300)
would be $150 greater than the sum of precaution costs and expected
injury costs after the employee's information-production efforts ($150
+ $0). Thus, the employee's $50 investment in relative risk informa-
tion would yield benefits of $150 and should be undertaken.
Left to his own devices, however, the employee would not produce
the risk information. That is because his private benefits from the in-
formation would total only $30-$20 less than his cost of producing
the information.8 3 Absent some way to claim for himself some of the
societal benefits of his risk information, he would not undertake the
efforts to produce the information, and the $150 cost-savings (really
only $100, since the $50 cost of the employee's effort must be sub-
tracted) would never be realized.
Stated generally, employees will engage in production of risk infor-
mation only when their expected individual benefits of doing so exceed
the expected costs of producing the information, which they will bear
in full. In many (probably most) cases, individual employees cannot
expect to reap benefits worth the costs of producing risk information-
costs that will tend to be high, since, as noted, safety data are not
readily accessible to prospective employees.8 4 Figure B illustrates the
decision calculus facing individual employees, and Figure C illustrates
how the divergence between total and private marginal benefits, a re-
sult of the positive externalities associated with risk information, will
lead to systematic employee underproduction of information regarding
workplace safety risks (i.e., to point x instead of point y).
83. For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming that the employee's expected individual
benefits equal his actual individual benefits, $30. In deciding whether or not to
make information-production efforts, he will, of course, weigh his expected bene-
fits against his expected costs.
84. Note that even when circumstances are such that employees would produce rela-
tive risk information on their own (i.e., even when their private benefits exceed
the costs of production), it is likely more efficient for employers to do so, as they
are probably the cheaper producers of such information.
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(2) Employer Underprovision of Risk Information
Employees, however, are not the only possible source of informa-
tion about workplace safety risks. One might expect employers at-
tempting to "sell" their jobs to provide comparative risk information,
much the way sellers of consumer products provide shoppers with
comparative information about the goods they are selling. Indeed, in-
formation about the characteristics of consumer products, like infor-
mation about workplace risks, exhibits positive externalities, and
consumers will therefore engage in a sub-optimal amount of informa-
tion-creation with respect to the relative quality of various brands and
types of consumer goods. Yet, no one could credibly claim that there is
a substantial dearth of information about the characteristics of con-
sumer goods. That is because market forces motivate vendors-at-
tempting to sell as many of their products as possible, and at the
highest price possible-to provide comparative price and quality infor-
mation to consumers through advertisements. Sellers of superior
quality and/or less expensive goods can thus be counted on to laud
their own products and point out the inferiority of their competitors'
goods. Unlike consumers, producers and sellers of consumer goods are
able to capture most of the benefits of their information-creation and
dissemination efforts (through increased sales and/or higher prices),8 5
and they therefore assume primary responsibility for generating and
distributing information about the quality of their, and their competi-
tors', products.
So why wouldn't job-sellers (employers), like product-sellers, ad-
vertise their own safety records and compare them to those of their
competitors? 8 6 For employers with poor safety records, the answer is
obvious: they have nothing good to say, so they say nothing at all. But
what about employers with exemplary safety records? Why don't they
advertise their own achievements and compare them to their competi-
tors' less stellar safety records, thereby providing the labor market
with all sorts of information about the relative safety of competing
employers?
The answer is that there is a significant difference between jobs
and consumer products that makes it unlikely for "sellers" of the for-
mer to advertise as extensively as sellers of the latter. Manufacturers
85. Producers and sellers who advertise reap a higher proportion of the benefits of
their information creation and dissemination efforts than do consumers who pro-
duce the information themselves. Accordingly, there is significantly less diver-
gence between the total and private marginal benefits of their efforts, and they,
unlike consumers, will not tend systematically to under-produce information
about the quality of their (and their less worthy competitors') products.
86. Cf Keith N. Hylton, Labor and the Supreme Court: Review of the 1996-1997
Term, 13 LAB. LAWYER 263, 271 (1997) (hypothesizing that employers that have
reduced risks of injuries will "provide information [about their reduced risks] in
order to gain a competitive advantage in the labor market").
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and sellers of consumer products can easily engage in comparative ad-
vertising, because the relevant characteristics of their competitors'
products-e.g., price and relative quality-are readily observable. A
manufacturer can almost always obtain her competitor's product, ex-
amine it, find some way her own product is superior, and publicize
that fact. By contrast, employers (job-sellers) generally cannot ob-
serve their competitors' workplaces and, in the absence of mandatory
disclosure rules, are not privy to competitors' health and safety data.8 7
Hence, it is very difficult for employers to state with confidence, "We
are safer than. .. "
Of course, even if an employer could not engage in comparative ad-
vertising, she could still laud her own safety record. Instead of stat-
ing, "We're safer than.. .", she could simply announce her own safety
statistics. An employer engaging in such "declarative" (as opposed to
comparative) advertising, however, risks competitors then being able
to say that they have better safety records than she. It is unlikely that
an employer would be the first mover in publicizing her safety record
unless she knew for certain that she possessed the best record among
all competitors. But even in that situation, the employer might not
want to be the first mover, for if the other employers just remained
silent about safety, her announcement of her workplace accident rate
would simply draw attention to the fact that her workplace is some-
what risky.8 8 Hence, employers, who cannot engage in comparative
advertising, are also unlikely to engage in declarative advertising of
their own safety records. Moreover, employers in concentrated indus-
tries may tacitly agree not to advertise workplace safety rates in order
to avoid drawing attention to the safety risks of the industry as a
whole, thereby driving away potential employees.8 9 Accordingly, sup-
pliers of jobs (employers), unlike suppliers of consumer goods, cannot
87. Cf Howard A. Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmak-
ing Under Uncertainty, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. J. 187, 229 (1982) (discussing how en-
vironmental assessments of products, unlike comparisons of product quality and
price, are difficult because data on pollution associated with the manufacture of
products and the resources consumed in manufacturing, unlike data on price and
quality, are not readily available to competitors or other evaluators).
88. In the 1930s, automobile manufacturers advertised the comparative safety of
their autos. Subsequently, this advertising disappeared because the auto makers
believed that calling attention to safety problems could hurt the industry more
than it benefited individual firms. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 28.
89. See id. (noting that individual airlines do not advertise their safety records in
order to avoid drawing any attention at all to the risks of air travel); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 656 (1993) (noting, with respect to advertising of compar-
ative product risks, that "[c]ompetition over the extent of danger may decrease
total purchases of the product, rather than help any manufacturer to obtain
greater sales," and that this phenomenon has sometimes played a role in discour-
aging competition over safety among manufacturers of tobacco products).
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be counted on to provide comparative information that "buyers" (pro-
spective employees) will not produce on their own.
(3) Inadequate Third Party Provision
But employees and employers are not the only possible private
sources of information about workplace safety risks. In the market for
consumer goods, third-party ratings agencies are fairly common.
Those ratings agencies-such as the Consumer Union, which pub-
lishes Consumer Reports-provide information to interested consum-
ers in exchange for some sort of payment. 90 While conflict of interest
concerns prevent ratings agencies from being funded by advertisers, 9 1
individuals in the market for consumer goods will frequently pay
enough for publications stating the agencies' findings to support the
agencies' information-production efforts. Consumer Reports, for ex-
ample, is subscriber-supported and provides relative price and quality
information about a host of consumer goods.9 2 Of course, the informa-
tion created by ratings agencies still exhibits positive externalities
that cannot be fully captured by the agencies, 93 and it is thus unlikely
that such agencies would ever generate a socially optimal amount of
information. But they undoubtedly provide a substantial amount of
information about consumer goods, and one might thus question why
similar agencies could not provide information about the risks of vari-
ous jobs and workplaces, obviating the need for a regulatory fix.
There are at least two reasons third-party information providers,
common in the consumer goods arena, will likely never provide a sig-
nificant quantum of information about workplace safety risks. The
first is essentially the same as the primary reason employers them-
selves do not advertise their relative safety:9 4 workplaces, unlike con-
sumer goods, cannot be easily examined and evaluated by third
parties unless the government requires employers to provide access to
the third-party monitors. 9 5 The second reason relates to how third-
90. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 534
& n.159 (2000) (referring to efforts of Consumer Reports as an effort to "give infor-
mation more 'private good' characteristics").
91. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805, 1830
& n.80 (1995) (noting that ratings publications often do not accept advertise-
ments in order to maintain independence).
92. For example, a recent issue of Consumer Reports included relative quality and
price ratings of air conditioners, vacuum cleaners, soy, bicycles, bike helmets, and
"crew-cab" pickup trucks. CONSUMER REPORTS, July 2004.
93. See Latin, supra note 87, at 231 ("Many people benefit from Consumer Reports
without paying for it; they read someone else's copy or learn of product evalua-
tions through word of mouth.").
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. Cf Latin, supra note 87, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. J. at 231 (discussing how environ-
mental assessments of products, unlike comparisons of product quality and price,
are difficult because data on pollution associated with the manufacture of prod-
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party information-creation efforts are funded. As noted, the consum-
ers of the information (a sufficient proportion of them, at least) must
purchase the information from the providers. Consumer Reports is
able to survive because it is a general interest publication that pro-
vides information about purchasing decisions consumers continually
make. It therefore remains of sustained interest to consumers, who
are willing to keep paying for it because forthcoming issues may pro-
vide useful, cost-saving information. By contrast, an "Employment
Report" that evaluated the characteristics of various workplaces
would not be of general sustained interest to consumers because rela-
tively few individuals are job-searching at a given moment, and even
fewer make continual employment decisions that would justify sub-
scribing to a workplace-rating periodical. In other words, consumer
demand for workplace information is not sufficient to support a third-
party's provision of that information. Hence, neither employees, em-
ployers, nor third-party ratings agencies are likely to produce suffi-
cient information about workplace risks. And absent such
information, employees are unlikely to demand risk premiums suffi-
cient to motivate efficient precaution-taking by employers.
b. Employers' Informational Deficiency
In addition to employees' informational deficiency with respect to
workplace safety risks, which other theorists have noted,96 a second
systematic informational deficiency may contribute to sub-optimal
precaution-taking in the workplace: Employers may possess inade-
quate information about cost-effective safety precautions they might
adopt, and the positive externalities associated with information re-
garding available precautions implies that, absent government inter-
vention or some private means of appropriating the external benefits
to the information-producer, such information will be systematically
under-produced. Thus, even if motivated to adopt all cost-effective
precautions, employers may fail to do so because they are ignorant of
such precautions.
Just as employees benefit from information regarding workplace
risks, employers, who ultimately pay for such risks, benefit from infor-
ucts and the resources consumed in manufacturing, unlike data on price and
quality, are not readily available to competitors or other evaluators).
96. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to Expand the Boundaries of Consumer
Sovereignty, 23 Hhav. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 211, 218-19 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,
Which Risks First?, 1997 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 101, 109 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity
& Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 587, 606 (1996); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradox-
ical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DuKE L. J. 729, 734;
Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Comment, Workplace Pollution: Nuclear Safety, Eth-
ics, and the Exploitation-Avoidance Argument, 12 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T
311, 319 (2001).
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mation about precautions that could cost-effectively reduce the risks.
Yet, individual employers will not produce precaution information
when their expected private benefits from the information are less
than the expected costs of production-even if the total benefits of the
information dwarf the costs of producing it. For example, suppose an
employer could, for $1,000, develop a precaution that would save em-
ployers in her position an average of $700 in risk premiums (which
would reflect the discounted present value of expected injury costs not
covered by workers' compensation). If there were 100 similarly situ-
ated employers, the employer's production efforts would yield net ben-
efits of $69,000.97 The employer, however, would not produce the
information because her cost of doing so ($1,000) would exceed her ex-
pected individual benefit ($700).98 Where individual employers face
this sort of decision calculus (represented graphically by Figure B,
supra) they will not invest in precaution-development, even though
their development efforts would, from a societal standpoint, be cost-
justified. Moreover, the "public good" nature of precaution informa-
tion (i.e., the information can be consumed without being depleted,
and there is no way to prevent it from being shared) implies that em-
ployers cannot fully capture the competitive advantage of a safer
workplace. 99 Thus, precaution information, like risk information,
may be underproduced in a free market (Figure C). There may there-
fore be a role for the government in remedying employers' systematic
informational deficiency. 1oo
97. The discounted present value of noncompensable injury costs would fall by
$70,000 ($700 per employer x 100 employers), at a cost of $1,000. This Article
assumes, somewhat unrealistically, that dissemination of the information to
other employees is costless.
98. For the sake of simplicity, this Article assumes that expected benefits equal ac-
tual benefits.
99. Information about potential precautions, like workplace risk information, is sus-
ceptible to free-riding. For example, a firm that adopts an assembly line config-
uration that cost-effectively reduces ergonomic risks will not be able to keep
competitors from adopting the same configuration. Even if competitors are not
able to visit workplaces and obtain precaution information by direct observation,
they may learn about safety precautions when employees change jobs and share
information about practices in place at their former workplaces. Moreover, even
if employees do not switch jobs, they may talk with employees of other firms and
share their employers' precaution methods. Accordingly, employers will not be
able to capture the full benefits, in the form of the competitive advantage that
would result from a unilateral decrease in injury rates, of efforts to research and
develop new safety measures, and they will therefore devote a sub-optimal level
of effort to discovering new safety precautions.
100. This argument is really a variation of the standard economic argument for public
funding of research that provides public benefits (i.e., is not privately appropria-
ble). Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1726 (1996) ("Public funding may still be justified under a public goods
rationale if the character of the research is such that patentable outcomes are
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There is a certain class of precaution information, however, that
will not be underproduced by private employers. For some risks, the
costs of discovering a precaution will be low relative to the expected
benefits the precaution would provide its developer. For example, de-
velopment of the precaution might cost the employer only $500 and
offer her an expected individual benefit of $1,000. With these sorts of
risks and precautions, employers will have adequate incentives to de-
velop precaution information, and there is therefore no need for the
government, which may be poorly situated to develop workplace-spe-
cific precautions,lo' to be involved in producing such information.1 0 2
Obvious workplace safety risks, such as unguarded blades or bright
flashes for which eye shades should be worn, would fall into this cate-
gory. For other risks, the cost of precaution research will be quite
high relative to an individual employers' expected cost-savings attrib-
utable to the precaution. Ergonomic risks likely fall into that cate-
gory. For such risks, individual employers-who can reap only their
individual benefits from any precaution information discovered-will
not engage in extensive research to develop precautions. Thus, the
case for government involvement in precaution research and develop-
ment is more compelling for non-obvious risks that require precau-
tions that are relatively difficult to develop.
C. How to Select a Regulatory Cure: Refining the "Least
Restrictive Alternative" Criterion
Once policymakers have identified the symptom potentially requir-
ing a regulatory cure (sub-optimal precaution-taking by employers)
and the culprit market failure (systematically inadequate risk and
precaution information), they are ready to select specific policy solu-
likely to be the exception rather than the rule, and the research promises sub-
stantial social benefits that cannot be captured by patent holders."); id. at 1725-
26 ("When research results are unlikely to be privately appropriated, the antici-
pated private benefits may appear inadequate to justify the investment of private
funds, even though the social benefits may be significant. In such a situation,
public funding is justified on 'public goods' grounds.").
101. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text (discussing comparative advan-
tage of employers in developing cost-effective precautions, given the need for
time- and space-specific information to which centralized regulators are not
privy).
102. Of course, it may be more efficient for the government to take the lead in develop-
ing even those safety precautions that employers would develop on their own.
For example, if the expected costs of developing a precaution are $500 and the
expected individual benefits are $700, the precaution will be developed by indi-
vidual employers, but at a cost of $500 per employer. If it were possible for the
government to develop the precaution information once and disseminate it to em-
ployers, substantial cost-savings could likely be achieved. See infra text accom-
panying notes 240-241. For present purposes, however, the important point to
grasp is that some cost-effective precautions will be developed privately, so it is
not necessary for the government to produce such information.
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tions. As noted, efficiency-minded regulatory theorists have sug-
gested that regulators should adopt the "least restrictive alternative"
when regulating to correct a market failure.1 0 3 But sometimes the
regulatory option that is literally least restrictive will not be socially
optimal, because more restrictive regulatory alternatives, though
more costly to implement, will provide higher net benefits.1 0 4 Simi-
larly, the "most effective alternative" is a flawed regulatory criterion
because the regulatory alternative that is most effective at eliminat-
ing market failure will not be most desirable if it costs significantly
more than slightly less effective alternatives.1 0 5 From an efficiency
standpoint, then, the focus should not be on how restrictive or effec-
tive a regulatory option is, but instead on its total net benefits-i.e.,
how much wealth it creates when its total costs and benefits are taken
into account. Sometimes, the optimal regulatory option will be
neither the least restrictive nor the most effective alternative.
Regulatory theorists' call for adoption of the least restrictive alter-
native probably stems from the fact that the least restrictive alterna-
tive criterion is a fairly good proxy for the highest net benefits
criterion. That is because the costs of regulatory approaches generally
increase as the approaches become more restrictive, so that, ceteris
paribus, less restrictive regulatory alternatives will provide higher net
benefits. Costs tend to increase with restrictiveness because more re-
strictive regulations have higher implementation costs and prohibit
more wealth-creating private transactions.10 6 For example, a regula-
103. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 185-86. See also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing
Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61
U. PITT. L. REv. 419, 432 (2000); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 22-
36 (1982); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Re-
strictive Alternatives, and Reform, 82 HARv. L. REV. 549, 586 (1979).
104. Suppose, for example, that simply providing information about a particular work-
place risk and available precautions would cost $5 million and would result in
precaution-taking that would save $10 million in injury costs, for a net benefit of
$5 million. Suppose further that the costs associated with a more restrictive ap-
proach mandating substantive safety standards totaled $10 million, and the cost
savings in terms of decreased workplace injuries totaled $20 million. The net
benefits of this latter regulatory approach would be $10 million, and the ap-
proach would be more desirable than the less restrictive, information-provision
approach.
105. For example, suppose that the total social cost of a market failure is $40 million
and that one regulation-a very restrictive rule-would completely eliminate the
market failure (and costs associated therewith) for $30 million. The regulation
would create net benefits of $10 million and would thus be cost-justified. It would
not be optimal, however, if there were a regulatory alternative that could provide
higher net benefits. For example, if a less restrictive regulatory option would
eliminate half the cost of the market failure (i.e., reduce it to $20 million) at a cost
of $5 million, then that regulatory option, with its $15 million in net benefits,
would be preferable, despite the fact that it is less effective
106. An example may clarify how costs increase with a move from less to more restric-
tive regulatory alternatives. Suppose an employer wanted to hire an employee to
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tion requiring risky goods to be sold with hazard warnings still per-
mits win-win transactions in which risk-preferring consumers
purchase such goods from sellers (creating wealth for both buyers and
sellers), whereas a more restrictive regulation banning the sale of all
such goods prohibits such trades and destroys the wealth created
thereby.t 0 7 Moreover, rights-based concerns argue in favor of less re-
strictive alternatives, for such approaches preserve a greater degree of
individual autonomy.l 08 It thus does make sense to focus on the re-
strictiveness of alternative regulatory regimes. That said, policymak-
perform task x, which poses risks that are not immediately obvious and that
could be reduced by 25% if the employer adopted a relatively unintrusive precau-
tion (pl) or by 50% if the employer adopted a more intrusive precaution (p2). In
such a situation, the employer would have a number of options. He could choose
to:
(1) hire the employee to do x, without taking any precaution or provid-
ing the employee with any risk information;
(2) hire the employee to do x, without taking any precaution but provid-
ing the employee with information about the risks of doing x;
(3) hire the employee to do x, but take precaution pl;
(4) hire the employee to do x, but take precaution p2; or
(5) not hire the employee to do x.
Workplace safety regulations designed to reduce the risks of x could preclude any
number of these choices. The least intrusive regulation would be a mandatory
disclosure rule, which would preclude option (1) by requiring that the employer
inform the employee of the risks of x, thus ensuring that the employee would
demand an adequate risk premium and thereby motivate the employer to take
whatever precautions are cost-effective. A "relaxed" substantive safety standard
might require the employer to adopt at least precaution pl (the less intrusive
safety precaution), thus precluding options (1) and (2). A more stringent safety
standard might require the employer to implement at least precaution p2, thus
precluding options (1) - (3). Finally, a regulation may simply prohibit x alto-
gether. Such a ban would eliminate options (1) - (4).
As the regulations become more restrictive (i.e., as they ban more options),
costs increase because mutually beneficial transactions are precluded. For exam-
ple, when the market failure to be regulated is informational inadequacy, every
regulation more restrictive than mandatory disclosure creates costs by thwarting
some wealth-creating transactions. This is because if an employer and an em-
ployee, informed of risks, would still freely choose to enter a transaction in which
the employee agreed to do the job (i.e., to accept the risk) in exchange for some
sum of money, that transaction must be mutually beneficial to the parties and
thus wealth-creating. If a regulation bans the transaction, the regulation de-
stroys wealth. Because individuals are heterogeneous in their tastes for risk, see
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 847-48 (2000) (discussing
sources of risk heterogeneity), there is great potential for wealth creation through
transactions in which less risk averse employees agree to accept risk in exchange
for compensation amounts that are less than the cost of reducing the risk. Forced
risk reduction thwarts these transactions. See id.
107. See Viscusi, supra note 106, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. at 847-48.
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 11, 20 FLA. ST. L. REV. at 659 (noting that clas-
sic command-and-control regulation should be an option of last resort because
"governmentally prescribed outcomes unnecessarily diminish the role of individ-
ual decisions and choices in forming individual lives").
1034 [Vol. 82:1006
WORKPLACE SAFETY REGULATION
ers' primary focus should be on the balance of costs and benefits of
various regulatory approaches; absent significant distributional ineq-
uities (which are themselves costs) policymakers should select the ap-
proach that creates the highest net benefits.
III. EXPLORING THE RANGE OF REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
Having defined the objectives of workplace safety regulation and
refined the criteria for selecting among policy options, regulators
should proceed to the second step of Professor Breyer's "simple axiom"
for avoiding regulatory mismatch: "examine the alternative methods
of obtaining the objectives."1 0 9 One endpoint on the range of "alterna-
tive methods" is the "pure libertarian" approach advocated by the
OSHA abolitionists. 1 10 Under that approach, the government would
do nothing to regulate precaution-taking in the workplace and would
instead rely exclusively on market processes (compensating differen-
tials) and the tort system (workers' compensation) to generate optimal
precaution-taking. Pure libertarianism would be optimal only if, at
every level, the marginal cost of government efforts to correct the in-
formational inadequacies leading to sub-optimal precaution-taking ex-
ceeded the marginal benefit of those efforts."' For an illustration, see
Figure D.
At the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum lies "pure paternal-
ism"-the command-and-control status quo defended by the OSHA
apologists.112 Under that approach, the government responds to the
problem of employers' failing to adopt all cost-effective safety precau-
tions by determining what those precautionary measures are and forc-
ing employers (via threat of sanctions) to adopt them. The approach is
called paternalistic because the government acts as a parent, telling
both employees and employers what is good for them. It is "pure" pa-
109. Recall Professor Breyer's "simple axiom for creating and implementing any [regu-
latory] program: determine the objectives, examine the alternative methods of
obtaining the objectives, and choose the best method for doing so." BREYER, supra
note 1, at 5.
110. See, e.g., Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19.
111. For an example in which these conditions appear to hold, consider the market
failure associated with home gardening. Without doubt, a market failure exists
with respect to individual homeowners' efforts to maintain and beautify their
yards: Homeowners are unable to capture all the marginal benefits of their yard-
improvement efforts, and neighbors and passersby therefore share the benefits of
a beautifully maintained yard without contributing anything to its maintenance.
Hence, private homeowners will engage in a sub-optimal amount of yard mainte-
nance. Policymakers, however, generally have not made efforts to remedy this
market failure, and the likely reason is that the costs of doing so would outweigh
the loss occasioned by the market failure.
112. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 54, at 22; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 96, at




ternalism (as opposed to "moderate" paternalism, which is discussed
below) because the government's normative judgment amounts to
more than just advice; employers and employees do not have freedom
to contract around the regulatory commands.
Between the pure libertarian approach of the OSHA abolitionists
and the pure paternalist approach of the OSHA apologists lie two mid-
die-ground positions that focus on remedying the particular informa-
tional deficiencies at issue. The less restrictive, which might be called
a "moderate libertarian" approach, acknowledges that some govern-
ment fix is desirable in the workplace safety arena but maintains that
that intervention should be limited to inducing private parties to pro-
vide information. More specifically, the government should motivate
employers to disclose information about workplace risks so that em-
ployees will demand adequate risk premiums and thereby induce opti-
mal precaution-taking on the part of employers. The government's
role is quite limited: Regulators-who are not privy to employees' risk
preferences, to employers' costs of risk abatement, or to the time- and
space-specific information necessary to craft effective precautions in
diverse workplaces-make no normative judgments about what bar-
gain employees and employers should strike in light of the informa-
tion. Thus, the government's role is in no way paternal. Most of the
theorists who have recognized that information inadequacy is the cul-
prit market failure leading to sub-optimal precaution-taking by em-
ployers have advocated some form of moderate libertarian, risk
disclosure approach.11 3
The other middle-ground position, which might be called "moder-
ate paternalism," includes the mandatory risk disclosure element of
moderate libertarianism but goes further. Under a moderate pater-
nalist approach, the government, in addition to requiring risk disclo-
sure, goes about finding ways for employers to reduce workplace
injuries and thereby helps employers and employees achieve the
"right" level of precaution-taking in the workplace.114 In contrast to
113. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV.
499, 534 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 851-53
(2000) (advocating workplace safety regulation focused on providing hazard
warnings so as to generate accurate compensating differentials and thereby to
motivate optimal precaution-taking); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SO-
CIAL JUSTICE 329-30 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 655-61 (presenting case
for informational regulation aimed at disclosing risks); WESLEY A. MAGAT & W.
KIP VIscusI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 4-9 (1992); Viscusi,
supra note 20, at 84-87.
114. Moderate paternalism includes risk disclosure as well as government involve-
ment in precaution development, because the latter element will rarely be needed
when the former is not needed. While there is a theoretical possibility that em-
ployees could be adequately informed of workplace risks but employers under-
informed about available cost-effective precautions, so that the optimal regula-
tory approach would be to educate employers regarding available precautions
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moderate libertarianism, moderate paternalism involves normative
judgments by the government that certain precautions should be
taken. In contrast to pure paternalism, however, such precautions are
not mandatory. Hence, the approach is paternalistic, but moderately
SO.
The following subsections examine the two middle-ground informa-
tional approaches and compare them to the pure paternalist (com-
mand-and-control) status quo. The goal of this exploration is to help
regulators avoid regulatory mismatch by determining under what con-
ditions less restrictive alternatives to classic command-and-control
regulation may maximize net benefits to society.
A. The Moderate Libertarian Approach: Mandatory Risk
Disclosure
Unlike a pure libertarian approach that would abolish workplace
safety regulation altogether,115 a moderate libertarian approach ac-
knowledges that there is a market failure, which could be cost-effec-
tively remedied, leading to sub-optimal precaution-taking by
employers: Workers are systematically under-informed regarding the
relative risks of jobs, and, given the positive externalities associated
with workplace risk information and its consequent tendency to be
under-produced by private actors in the free market, will likely re-
main under-informed absent some sort of government intervention. 116
Therefore, moderate libertarianism asserts, the government should
remedy this systematic informational deficiency by requiring those
private parties for whom risk information is most accessible-employ-
ers-to disclose it to employees, who will then be equipped to demand
without mandating employer disclosure of relative risk, such situations are likely
to be quite uncommon. That is because, as explained above, see supra text accom-
panying notes 98 to 102, employers will tend to be under-informed of precautions
only when their individual expected benefits from precaution development are
less than the expected costs of development. When expected accident costs (and
thus the benefits to employers of precaution development) are relatively high,
and when the costs of developing precaution information are relatively low (as
will tend to be the case with obvious risks, which typically suggest obvious pre-
cautions), employers will tend to be adequately motivated to develop precaution
information on their own and will not be systematically under-informed. See id.;
see also infra text accompanying notes 237 to 239 (discussing types of risks for
which employers will be adequately motivated to develop precautions on their
own). And, of course, these same circumstances will tend to hold when employees
are optimally aware of risks. Thus, it is generally safe to assume that if employ-
ees are aware of risks, employers will be aware of available safety precautions.
Conversely, if employers are not aware of available precautions (so that employer
education would be desirable), then employees will not be optimally aware of
risks (so that mandatory risk disclosure would be desirable as well).
115. See Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19, at 46.
116. See supra subsection II.B.2.a.
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adequate risk premiums.117 Private employers will then be driven by
the profit motive to develop and implement cost-effective safety pre-
cautions, which they are best-suited to develop, given their intimate
knowledge of their workplaces. Thus, the goal of the moderate liberta-
rian approach is merely to facilitate internalization of risks (and
thereby to ensure an efficient level of precaution-taking) by getting
risk information into the labor market so that the market wage rate
will reflect the risks to which workers are exposed."l 8
1. Structuring a Mandatory Disclosure Regime
In crafting a moderate libertarian, mandatory disclosure regime,
policymakers must address two key questions. First, how should the
government ensure that risk information gets into the labor market?
And second, what type of information must be disclosed?
a. Getting Risk Information into the Market: The Need for
Universal Disclosure
Policymakers must first decide how extensive disclosure of risk in-
formation must be in order to ensure that the information gets into
117. As noted above, see supra note 77, not every employee needs to demand a risk
premium in order to motivate the employer to provide one. See also infra text
accompanying notes 125-130 and 209-211. Where price discrimination (wage dis-
crimination) is impossible or difficult, as will likely be the case with most jobs
posing safety risks, the size of the risk premium (and, for that matter, the wage
amount) will be determined according to the demands of the marginal em-
ployee-i.e., the last employee the employer needs to hire in order to be able to
operate her business. See Butler & Chauvin, supra note 77, at 1; Sharon Rabin-
Margalioth, Anti-discrimination, Accommodation, and Universal Mandates -
Aren't They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 120 n.33 (2003)
(noting that the valuation decisions of marginal employees, "those employees who
are on the margin of participating in the labor market or withholding their labor
at the going wage," determine market wages). The remaining employees may
free ride off the bargaining efforts of the marginal employee. Thus, the fact that
comparative risk information would not matter to most employees does not imply
that a moderate libertarian, mandatory disclosure regime will be unable to inter-
nalize workplace risks via increased risk premiums.
118. Empirical evidence shows that workers do respond to risk information the way
the moderate libertarian approach assumes they will. In a 1984 study by W. Kip
Viscusi and Charles O'Connor, workers told that they would soon be working
with sodium bicarbonate, a safe chemical, reduced their assessment of workplace
hazards by 50 per cent. Workers told that they would be working with either
asbestos or TNT increased their assessments of workplace hazards by 200 per
cent. While no workers required extra compensation to handle the sodium bicar-
bonate, workers demanded an extra $3,000 to $5,000 per year to handle the dan-
gerous asbestos or TNT. No workers said that they would quit because they were
going to have to handle sodium bicarbonate, but a majority of the workers said
they would quit because they would be handling asbestos or TNT. See W. Kip
Viscusi & Charles J. O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are
Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?, 74 Am. ECON. REv. 942 (1984).
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the labor market and influences "prices" for workers. Existing disclo-
sure regimes differ on this issue. Some, such as the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA")119 and the
periodic disclosure provisions of Securities Exchange Act,12 0 require
only one centralized filing of information. Others, such as the Federal
Trade Commission's ("FTC's") Appliance Labeling Rule121 and the fed-
eral Truth-in-Lending Act,122 require more exhaustive disclosure-
i.e., to each potential purchaser. Thus, regulators must decide
whether to require employers to provide risk information to each ac-
tual and prospective employee (a "universal disclosure" regime), or
merely to a single clearinghouse (a "centralized disclosure" regime).
In the end, the practicalities of the job search process likely render a
universal disclosure approach preferable.
Direct provision of information to each employee would, of course,
result in a more exhaustive distribution of information, but universal
disclosure would probably cost more than a rule requiring one central-
ized risk report (per reporting period).123 Moreover, to the extent the
goal of a mandatory disclosure regime is efficiency12 4-i.e., is to en-
sure that employers bear the full cost of job risks so that they have an
incentive to take all cost-effective precautions to reduce such risks-
the goal need not be to guarantee that each individual employee
knows precisely what risks a job entails. The regulation need only
ensure that such risk information is available to the market so that the
price for workers (i.e., the wage rate) can adjust to reflect the relative
riskiness of the job. Accordingly, centralized disclosure might be suffi-
cient, for in a competitive labor market in which wage discrimination
is impossible, as long as a sufficient proportion of employees know
what the risks of a job are, the market wage will adjust to account for
that information, and the uninformed employees will be able to free-
ride off the information the informed employees have discovered.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2002).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2002).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 6294 (2002); 16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (2002).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (2002); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (2002).
123. The costs to employers would obviously be higher under a rule requiring employ-
ers to provide risk information to each employee than under a rule requiring only
a one-time (per period) risk report to an information clearinghouse. Of course,
such a universal disclosure rule would be less costly to employees, who would not
have to access a centralized database to obtain workplace risk information. But,
as many (or most) employees-the non-searchers, who free-ride off the efforts of
searchers, see infra notes 125 to 128 and accompanying text-would never search
a centralized database, the total cost savings to employees under the universal
disclosure rule would not likely offset the higher costs to employers. Accordingly,
the universal disclosure rule will likely impose higher total costs than a rule re-
quiring centralized reporting.
124. Mandatory disclosure can be justified on both efficiency and rights-based
grounds. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
2004] 1039
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
To see why this is so, consider the "search equilibrium" model that
applies to markets for consumer goods. Professors Alan Schwartz and
Louis L. Wilde posited this model to explain how the free-riding possi-
bility protects uninformed consumers. 12 5 Professors Schwartz and
Wilde first noted that consumers differ in their shopping behavior:
some gather a substantial amount of information (particularly com-
parative price and quality information) before purchasing a good,
some amass no information, and some engage in moderate search.126
The searching consumers, Schwartz and Wilde contended, end up pro-
tecting those consumers who engage in only limited (or no) search,
because it is generally too expensive for firms to distinguish among
extensive, moderate, and non-searchers and to enter different sales
contracts for each of those groups.12 7 Therefore, if there are enough
searchers in the market for a consumer good, firms have incentives
both to compete for the searchers' business and to offer the same
terms to non-searchers. Accordingly, Schwartz and Wilde concluded,
"[wihen the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the
preferences of non-searchers, competition among firms for searchers
should tend to protect all consumers."128
At first glance, there is reason to think this same free-riding phe-
nomenon might operate in the job market, or at least in the market for
jobs posing safety risks. In most such markets, the two key condi-
tions-(1) that the job market is competitive so that employers have
an incentive to vie for searchers as well as non-searchers, and (2) that
employers are unable to engage in wage discrimination so that they
will offer the same wages to non-searchers as searchers-appear to be
met. To be sure, price discrimination (i.e., wage discrimination) is
much easier when the commodity at issue is a job rather than a con-
sumer good; unlike most over-the-counter sales contracts, most em-
ployment contracts do involve some measure of individual negotiating.
But for the typical job for which workplace safety is a concern-one
involving some sort of manual labor-contract terms are generally
pretty standardized. It would be difficult for a factory owner to distin-
guish "searching" prospective employees from "non-searchers" and of-
fer different wage rates to the two groups. Hence, to the extent the
factory owner attempted to woo searching applicants by providing a
compensating differential that adequately accounted for the riskiness
of the job, non-searching applicants would be protected as well. They
would be able to free-ride off the searchers' efforts because the em-
125. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630
(1979).
126. Id. at 637.




ployer would not be able to discriminate against them in setting wage
rates. Accordingly, the regulatory regime may not need to mandate
provision of risk information to each prospective employee in order to
ensure efficiency. Instead, the government might require merely that
the employer provide risk information to a centralized clearinghouse,
which searching employees (and their intermediaries) could easily ac-
cess. 129 As long as the information got to an adequate number of
searching applicants, the wage offered all employees would be efficient
in that it would reflect fair payment for the risks imposed and would
thus provide the employer with an incentive to take all cost-effective
precautions.
But therein lies the rub. For non-searchers to be able to free-ride
off the efforts of searchers, there must be a sufficient number of
searchers. 130 If only a very small proportion of prospective employees
make the effort to educate themselves concerning the risks of a work-
place, the employer will not raise wages to attract those employees
unless the supply of workers is extremely tight. In most cases, the
employer, rationally assuming that each prospective employee is un-
educated regarding the true workplace risks, will refuse to offer a risk
premium reflective of the actual, but unknown, risks. The employer
may fail to attract the prospective employees who have bothered to
educate themselves, but as long as there are not too many of those
employees (i.e., as long as there are enough non-searchers to meet the
employer's demand for workers), the employer will not need to raise
wages to reflect hidden risks.131 Hence, free-riding off searchers' ef-
forts cannot occur unless there are enough searchers.
Without engaging in some sophisticated empirical research, it is
impossible to say how many searchers would be required for free-rid-
ing to occur. But, given the relatively lower education and income
levels of employees that accept jobs posing significant safety risks, one
would assume that such employees would be relatively unlikely to ex-
pend the resources necessary to ferret out relative job risk informa-
tion. It is therefore likely that there would not be enough searchers to
render successful a regulation mandating only centralized disclosure
of job risks. Accordingly, a centralized job risk disclosure regime
129. This model resembles the securities laws requiring public companies to file peri-
odic disclosure statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2002). For a summary of the
periodic disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act, see Stephen
J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAvIs L. REV.
533, 537 n.12 (2002).
130. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 125, at 638.
131. In other words, in order for non-searchers to be protected by the efforts of search-
ers, conditions of supply and demand in the labor market must be such that the
employer must hire some searchers in order to operate at her desired level. If
there is a glut of available workers, or if the proportion of searching employees is
quite low, the employer may be able to avoid hiring any searchers.
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would probably not succeed at generating adequate risk premiums,
and, despite the universal disclosure regime's higher administrative
costs, requiring employers to provide job risk information to each pro-
spective employee is probably preferable.
b. Presenting the Risk Information: The Need for
Presentation of Comparative Risks
The second issue regulators must address in structuring a
mandatory disclosure policy is how the risk information should be
presented. An extensive body of empirical evidence indicates that, for
effective risk communication, presentation matters; individuals tend
to respond differently to identical risk information that is presented in
different ways. 132 Thus, policy makers should seek to determine how
job risk information should be presented so that prospective employ-
ees can digest and process it most effectively.
For efficiency purposes, the primary objective of a mandatory dis-
closure regime is to inform prospective employees of the comparative
risks of jobs they are considering. No job, after all, is riskless, and the
ultimate goal of mandatory disclosure is to ensure that employees,
when negotiating wages, demand risk premiums that accurately cor-
relate with the relative magnitude of safety risks their jobs impose.
Hence, what employees really need to know in order for internaliza-
tion to occur through compensating differentials is how the risks of
the various jobs they are considering compare with one another.
This observation might initially suggest that the mandatory disclo-
sure regime should require reporting of comparative risks. Other
mandatory disclosure regimes concerned with ensuring that individu-
als learn of relative characteristics require that information be
presented in comparative form. For example, the energy-efficiency la-
beling rules require presentation of comparative efficiency informa-
tion, 133 and the truth-in-lending laws require publication of
comparative interest rates.X34 But there are some disclosure regimes,
equally concerned with informing individuals of comparative risk,
that do not require information to be presented in comparative form.
132. See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT AND W. Kip Viscusi, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION 88-92 (1992); James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in
Presenting Risk Information, in W. KIP VIsCUsi AND WESLEY MAGAT, LEARNING
ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION (1987);
Viscusi, supra note 106, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. at 852-53.
133. See 16 C.F.R. § 305.11(a)(5)(i)(F), (G) (2003).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.14 (2002). Cf Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1533 (1998) (noting that the federal truth-in-lending laws
seek to "foster comparison shopping" by "requir[ing] lenders to announce interest
rates measured the same way").
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Consider, for example, the securities laws. 135 All securities pose some
risk to investors, and the relevant information for investors is how the
risks of various securities compare. The securities laws do not, how-
ever, require issuers to provide comparative information about the se-
curities they are selling. Instead, they have to provide information
about only their own securities. Perhaps the job risk disclosure re-
gime should be modeled after the securities laws, requiring employers
to disclose information about only their own risks, without reference
to how those risks compare to those of competitors. Such a rule would
be less costly to employers, who would not have to obtain data about
their competitors' job risks.
But a rule requiring disclosure of information about only one's own
risks is probably not the most cost-effective option when all the costs
of information transfer are considered. If comparative risk informa-
tion is really what prospective employees need in order for internaliza-
tion of job risks to occur, and if employers do not present risk
information in comparative form, then employees or some other in-
termediaries will have to collect the relevant information and perform
the comparison; otherwise, the employers' provision of risk informa-
tion will be pointless. The key question, then, is, "Who is the low-cost
comparer?" If employees or their intermediaries can perform compari-
sons more cheaply than employers, then the mandatory disclosure re-
gime should require only the provision of employer-specific
information. If, however, employers are the low-cost comparers, then
they should be required to disclose risk information in comparative
form. Indeed, this observation that the low-cost comparer should do
the comparing may explain the variation among other mandatory dis-
closure regimes. Securities laws require only issuer-specific informa-
tion because there is a vast collection of intermediaries (i.e., securities
analysts) who have a comparative advantage in comparing securities
risks.136 By contrast, appliance manufacturers have a comparative
advantage in comparing the energy efficiency of various appliances.
Relative to manufacturers, consumers are poorly situated to perform
the necessary comparisons, and the market will not support an indus-
try of intermediaries (i.e., "appliance efficiency analysts") to put the
information in comparative form. Hence, the law wisely requires
manufacturers to perform the comparison task. Similarly, in the
workplace safety arena, employers are in a better position than em-
ployees to conduct risk comparison, and there are not likely to be in-
termediaries who can perform the comparison task more cheaply.
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (2002).
136. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 118 (noting that "[brokerage houses and invest-
ment advisors typically publish a stock's beta [i.e., a measure of the stock's rela-
tive risk] as part of their investor advising services").
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Thus, employers, the low-cost risk comparers, should be required to
provide comparative risk information.
c. What Might a Mandatory Disclosure Rule Look Like?
The FTC's Appliance Labeling Rule provides a model for how the
government might require employers to provide employees with com-
parative risk information.13 7 Adopted in 1980, the Appliance Label-
ing Rule aims "to assist consumers in making purchasing
decisions"138 by requiring manufacturers of covered products to attach
labels stating (1) the estimated annual operating costs based on the
amount of energy and/or water consumed, and (2) the range of operat-
ing costs for the particular type of product. 139 Of course, in addition to
helping consumers make purchase decisions, the rule encourages
manufacturers to adopt energy efficient designs, for consumer knowl-
edge that an appliance is relatively inefficient will, ceteris paribus,
lower the price the manufacturer may charge for the product. Evi-
dence indicates that the rule has been effective in motivating energy
efficient designs.140
In order to guard against "apples to oranges" comparisons, the rule
standardizes how annual operating costs 14 1 and ranges of operating
costs 14 2 are to be determined. Then, it requires that all covered man-
ufacturers 143 present the required information conspicuously and in a
137. The FTC adopted the Appliance Labeling Rule pursuant to the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (Dec. 22, 1975), which authorizes
the Commission to adopt labeling rules specifying the relative energy efficiency
for certain electric goods and the relative water efficiency for particular goods
that use water. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6292(a)(specifying covered goods),
6294 (providing authority for labeling rule). The statute requires the Commis-
sion to mandate disclosure of the estimated operating cost of covered products,
see 42 U.S.C. § 6294(c)(1)(A), and the range of estimated annual operating costs
for such products. See id. at § 6294(c)(1)(B). It also directs the FTC to standard-
ize the test procedures for determining annual operating cost of covered products,
see id. at § 6294(c)(2)(C), and to provide prototype labels and directions for dis-
playing them. See id. at § 6294(c)(2)(D).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 6294(c)(3) (stating that the goal of providing consumer assistance
should guide the Commission's determinations of how labels should be
displayed).
139. See 16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (1999).
140. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Energy Labels: After 20 Years, Still a Bright Idea, avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/appliances/20years.htm (last
viewed May 1, 2004).
141. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 305.5; 305.9 (1999).
142. See id. at § 305.10 (1999).
143. The rule is quite exhaustive, covering refrigerators, freezers, dishwashers, water
heaters, room air conditioners, clothes washers, furnaces, central air condition-
ers, heat pumps, fluorescent lamp ballasts, fluorescent lamps, incandescent
lamps, showerheads, faucets, toilets, urinals, and pool heaters. See id. at § 305.3
(1999).
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standard format,' 44 so that consumers may easily compare the effi-
ciency of various brands. Figure E is a prototype label the FTC has
provided manufacturers.
One can easily imagine an analogous regulatory scheme that
would require employers to report the relative safety of their work-
places to prospective employees. Such a reporting requirement would
not impose significant additional data collection requirements on em-
ployers, for OSHA already requires employers to keep a log of injuries
and illnesses and to report such data to the agency,145 and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics ("BLS") collects and processes these data and com-
piles industry-specific data that would enable comparisons similar to
those made pursuant to the Appliance Labeling Rule. 146 Indeed,
BLS's own website explains how firms may calculate their injury/ill-
ness incidence rates, 147 and once an employer had determined her
firm's various incidence rates, 148 she could easily compare those rates
to readily available BLS data on the incidence rates for similarly-sized
firms within her industry and sub-industry. 149
144. See id. at § 305.11(a)(l)-(4) (1999).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1904, et seq. (2002).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 673 (2002); OSH Overview, at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshover.htm
(last visited May 1, 2004).
147. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOW TO COMPUTE YOUR FIRM'S INCIDENCE RATE
FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT, at http://www.bls.gov/osheval.htm (last modified Dec.
19, 2003). First, the employer must count the number of OSHA recordable inju-
ries and/or illnesses, which the employer must record on the Log and Summary of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses. Then the employer must determine the total
number of employee hours worked at the firm. She may use payroll or other time
records to determine this figure, or, if employees do not work by the hour, she
may estimate the figure on the basis of scheduled hours or eight hours per em-
ployee per workday. Once she has ascertained the number of relevant injuries
and illnesses and the number of employee hours worked, the employer can easily
compute her firm's injury/illness rate by plugging the values into the following
formula:
Incidence Rate = (Number of Injuries/Illnesses X 200,000) / Employee
Hours Worked. (The 200,000 hours in the formula represents the
equivalent of 100 employees working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per
year, and provides the standard base for incidence rates.)
148. Using BLS's basic formula, an employer could easily determine several different
injury/illness incidence rates, for OSHA and BLS data are readily available to
enable the employer to ascertain and compare her incidence rates for: (1) total
injuries/illnesses; (2) lost workday injuries/illnesses; (3) lost workday injuries; (4)
lost workday illnesses; (5) minor (i.e., no lost workdays) injuries/illnesses; (6) mi-
nor injuries; and (7) minor illnesses. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Injury &
Illness Data, at http://bls.gov.iif/oshsum.htm#OlQuartile%2OData (last visited
May 1, 2004). However, in order to avoid information overload, see W. Kip Vis-
cusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law,
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 633 (1996), a disclosure regulation should probably re-
quire the employer to provide comparative data on only the total and lost work-
day injury/illness rates.
149. Following the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, BLS divides private
industry into "divisions" and then breaks down these divisions into "major
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An example clarifies the ease with which an employer could gener-
ate information about the relative safety of her firm. Suppose the
Capitol Hill Sausage Company has 300 employees and recorded 37 in-
juries or illnesses in 2001. Assuming the employees work 35 hours
per week with two weeks of vacation, Capitol Hill workers log 525,000
hours each year. Once the employer has determined the number of
injuries/illnesses and the number of hours worked, she could easily
calculate Capitol Hill's total illness/injury incidence rate:150 (37 X
200,000). / 525,000 = 14.1.
She could also easily calculate the company's serious (i.e., lost-
workday) injury/illness rate. 15 1 Suppose the company recorded 21
lost-workday injuries. Its lost workday injury/illness incidence rate
would be: (21 X 200,000) / 525,000 = 8.0.
Current and prospective employees would want to know where
Capitol Hill's injury/illness incidence rates stand relative to those of
its peer sausage manufacturers. Figure F presents BLS data for sau-
sage manufacturers with between 250 and 999 employees. 15 2 With a
total injury/illness incidence rate of 14.1 and a lost-workday injury/
illness rate of 8.0, Capitol Hill is a relatively, but not notably, unsafe
sausage manufacturer. With respect to both injury/illness rates, it is
within the third-safest quartile, a bit riskier than the median firm.
But prospective and current employees, most likely not limiting
themselves to sausage-making jobs, would also want to know how
Capitol Hill's injury/illness rates compare to those of other employers.
groups," which are divided into "industry groups" and finally into "industries."
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURY AND ILLNESS
RATES OF TOTAL RECORDABLE CASES BY QUARTILE DISTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYMENT
SIZE GROUP, PRIVATE INDUSTRY 1998, at http://www.bls.gov/special.requests/ocwc/
oshwc/osh/os/ostb0770.pdf (last visited Jan 22, 2004). Industries, the most re-
fined unit of analysis (besides individual firms), are rather specific. For example,
"preserved fruit and vegetable manufacturers"-an industry group within the
major group "food and kindred products," which is in the manufacturing divi-
sion-is divided into six separate industries: (1) canned specialties; (2) canned
fruits, vegetables, preserves, jams, and jellies; (3) dried and dehydrated fruits,
vegetables, and soup mixes; (4) pickled fruits and vegetables, vegetable sauces
and seasonings, and salad dressings; (5) frozen fruits, fruit juices, and vegetables;
and (6) frozen specialties not elsewhere classified. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSI-
FICATION MANUAL 74-76 (1987). BLS data even break down industries into
groups of similarly-sized firms: separate figures are reported for firms with 1-10,
11-49, 50-249, 250-999, and over 1,000 employees.
150. See supra note 147.
151. See id. A "lost workday" injury is an injury that "involve[s] days away from work,
or days of restricted work activity, or both." See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DEFINITIONS, at http://www.
bls.gov/iifloshdef.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
152. The information in Figure F is from BLS' website. "Total injury/illness" data are
available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/os/ostbll33.txt. "Lost workday injuries/
illnesses" data are available at http://www.bls.gov/iifloshwc/os/ostbll34.txt.
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In other words, the employees would want to know whether sausage-
making in general is particularly risky. Hence, it is useful to compare
Capitol Hill's injury rates with those of the manufacturers of all "food
and kindred products." Because BLS records aggregate "industry
group" data, as well as industry data,153 such comparisons are easy.
BLS data provided in Figure G reveal injury/illness rates for all manu-
facturers of food products.154 These data suggest that sausage manu-
facturing is a relatively dangerous category of food manufacturing.
Capitol Hill's total injury/illness and lost-workday incidence rates
(14.1 and 8.0, respectively), which were slightly higher than the me-
dian for sausage manufacturers, are substantially higher than the me-
dian for food manufacturers in general.
Given the ease with which employers may determine their injury/
illness incidence rates and compare them to other firms in their indus-
tries and industry groups, it is easy to imagine a regulatory regime,
similar to the Appliance Labeling Rule, that would require employers
to provide this comparative risk information to employees. The rule
might require the employer to procure current and prospective em-
ployees' signatures on forms that include a display, modeled after the
labels required under the Appliance Labeling Rule, indicating the em-
ployer's injury/illness incidence rate and where that rate stands rela-
tive to the relevant industry and industry group. The rule could also
require that the employer's workers' compensation insurer sign off on
the form155 and that the form be prominently displayed around the
workplace. Employees, then, would have a fairly good idea of the mag-
nitude of risks presented and would be in a good position to determine
whether the compensation the employer is offering is sufficient, given
the job risks.156 Employers who initially failed to offer adequate com-
153. See supra note 149.
154. See supra note 152 (identifying data sources).
155. This would help internalize workplace safety risks by ensuring that premiums for
workers' compensation insurance accurately reflected the relative risk of the
workplace. Of course, insurers have an incentive to (and do) collect injury and
illness information from employers, so requiring that the information be provided
to insurers may not increase insurer monitoring. It may, however, reduce the
costs of such monitoring, as employers are likely able to collect and process the
injury/illness information more cheaply than insurers.
156. But what about the situation where a normally safe workplace suffers some sort
of freak accident that generates an aberrant incidence rate? Would not the pro-
posed disclosure rule result in unfairness to the employer, who would have to
report an injury rate that paints an unduly dire picture of the safety of his work-
place? Not necessarily. First, this concern could be addressed by requiring dis-
closure of, say, a five-year average incidence rate rather than last year's
incidence rate. Aberrant years, then, would appear less startling. But there may
not be any need to adjust the rule to require multi-year averages. As long as the
disclosure rule did not restrict employers from providing additional information,
on top of the required comparative information, any unfairness stemming from
aberrant years could be mitigated. Employers burdened with having to report a
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pensation would find it difficult to attract qualified employees and
would likely end up paying higher risk premiums.15 7 In short, requir-
ing disclosure of comparative risk information would help ensure that
the costs of workplace risks are internalized to the employers. 158 Fig-
ure H presents an example of a safety disclosure form for the Capitol
Hill Sausage Company.
2. Evaluation of the Moderate Libertarian, Mandatory Risk
Disclosure Approach
When the market failure at issue is systematic employee ignorance
of risks and there is no reason to believe that employers are systemati-
bad year would be free to present additional data (e.g., data from previous years)
to employees in order to demonstrate that their workplaces are actually safer
than last year's data would suggest. Indeed, as the market failure this regulation
is aimed at remedying is information inadequacy, additional data presentation
should be encouraged. A perhaps more troubling problem would arise when nor-
mally unsafe workplaces experience an anomalously safe year. Prospective em-
ployees might receive an unduly rosy picture of the employer's safety record, and
this concern might thus justify adopting a disclosure rule requiring presentation
of multi-year averages. On the other hand, even normally unsafe workplaces
should be rewarded when they experience an unusually safe year.
157. As explained above, see supra notes 77 and 117, the risk premium would be based
on the demands of the marginal employee, so internalization could occur even if
the vast majority of employees paid no attention to the comparative risk
information.
158. It is important to keep in mind that the primary purpose of risk disclosure is not
to ensure that each individual employee gets paid the "right" amount for the risks
he undertakes. While that distributional result may be a fortuitous consequence
of risk disclosure, the primary reason for disclosing relative risk is to ensure that
the employer ultimately has to pay a premium for the risk he imposes and thus
faces an incentive to take all cost-effective precautions to reduce that risk. From
the employers' perspective, it does not matter to whom the risk premium is paid.
It may be paid to the employees who are actually burdened with the risks, or to
other employees, or to the employer's insurer. Regardless of who receives the
premium, if the magnitude of the premium is accurately tailored to the size of the
risks imposed, then the employer will have an incentive to take a hard look at his
workplace, determine where the risks are and how they could be reduced, and
take all cost-effective precautions to reduce those risks. Thus, to procure the in-
ternalization benefits of a risk disclosure regime, it is not necessary to segment
risks by particular positions within the firm. In practice, however, it is likely
that the employer will end up paying risk premiums to those employees that de-
serve them. If, for example, a receptionist from Capitol Hill Sausage Company
demanded a risk premium based on the risk information presented above, the
employer would likely point out to the receptionist that it is the line workers who
are incurring the risks and thus deserve a premium. By contrast, if a line worker
used the statistics in an attempt to demand a premium, the employer could not
convincingly respond that the risks were borne by others. Thus, in practice, the
employees who face the risks will likely be the ones receiving risk premiums.
From an efficiency standpoint, however, it does not matter whom the employer
ultimately ends up having to pay.
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cally under-informed of available safety precautions, 15 9 a moderate
libertarian approach focused on mandatory risk disclosure will pro-
vide a narrowly tailored remedy that avoids many of the inefficiencies
associated with the paternalistic, command-and-control status quo.
As explained below,160 this may be true even if, as the behavioralist
economists claim, individuals possess bounded rationality and are be-
set with various cognitive quirks that make it difficult for them to pro-
cess risk information. But mandatory risk disclosure may not
motivate optimal precaution-taking when the culprit market failure
includes a systematic informational deficiency on the part of employ-
ers regarding available cost-effective precautions. In such circum-
stances, a more intrusive regulatory approach may be warranted.
a. Benefits of the Approach
In most cases, the moderate libertarian, mandatory disclosure ap-
proach will produce higher net benefits than, and will thus be prefera-
ble to, both the pure libertarianism of the OSHA abolitionists 16 1 and
the pure paternalism advocated by the OSHA apologists. 162 Unlike
pure libertarianism, a moderate libertarian approach does not merely
ignore the problem of employees' lack of information about workplace
risks (an approach that makes sense only in the rare case in which the
cost of any amount of effort to educate employees is greater than the
benefit produced thereby).163 A mandatory disclosure approach is
also likely, for a number of reasons, to be preferable to pure paternal-
ism's inflexible substantive safety standards.
First, mandatory disclosure thwarts fewer potential gains from
trade than command-and-control.1 6 4 The fact is, individuals differ in
their tolerance for risk; most are risk averse, but some are indifferent
to, or actually prefer, risk.165 Similarly, employers differ in their costs
of eliminating risk; some can do so cheaply, but for others marginal
risk reduction is quite expensive-more expensive than simply paying
employees an ex ante premium for accepting the risk or compensating
them ex post for any workplace accidents. When an employee that is
159. See supra subsection II.B.2 (noting circumstances in which employers will be ade-
quately motivated to produce information regarding safety precautions); infra
subsection III.B.2.b (same).
160. See infra subsection III.A.2.b.(1).
161. See, e.g., Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19.
162. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 54, at 22; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 96, at
729; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 96, at 587; Shrader-Frechette, supra note
96, at 311.
163. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
165. See Viscusi, supra note 106, at 847-48 (discussing sources of risk heterogeneity).
Cf BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 116 & n.10 (explaining risk heterogeneity in
connection with portfolio theory).
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less risk-averse hooks up with an employer for whom risk reduction is
relatively expensive, there is a potential for gains from trade as long
as the parties are free to allow the risk to remain.16 6 Regulatory flexi-
bility therefore facilitates wealth creation by permitting employees to
sell their right to be free from risk.16 7
Second, a regime focused on risk disclosure, unlike a command-
and-control regime, enlists employees themselves in preventing work-
place accidents, and employees often end up being the cheaper acci-
dent-preventers. Workplace accidents are usually not due simply to a
risky technology; some sort of employee error is generally required.
Accordingly, it may frequently be more efficient to reduce accidents by
reducing employee error rather than by eliminating the potentially
hazardous technology.16s Disclosure regimes allow employers and
employees to determine who will take steps to reduce injuries. By con-
trast, technology-based safety standards force the employer to act as
accident-preventer, even if the employee could do so more cheaply.
Third, mandatory disclosure lacks command-and-control's strin-
gent (and costly) information requirement.16 9 In a command-and-con-
166. See Viscusi, supra note 106, at 847-48. Consider, for example, a situation where
a risk-indifferent employee simply does not care about a particular risk that is
quite expensive for an employer to eliminate. As the risk is tolerable to the em-
ployee and expensive for the employer to reduce, the employer may choose to
permit the risk to remain and simply pay the employee some premium for ac-
cepting the risk. Compared to the situation in which a rule requires elimination
of the risk, the employer gains the difference between the risk premium and the
amount he would have to pay to eliminate the risk, and the employee gains the
amount of the risk premium. If the law were to force the employer to eliminate
the risk, both parties would be worse off.
167. Transactions in which employees agree to accept risk in exchange for a risk pre-
mium are Pareto superior, for at least one party (the employer, who freely
chooses to pay the risk premium rather than to eliminate the risk) is better off,
and no party is worse off. (The employee must perceive himself to be at least as
well off with the risk premium as he would be if the risk were eliminated, or he
would refuse to accept the job.)
168. As Professors Magat and Viscusi explain:
Information regulation may also be a more effective means of promoting
safety than direct technological controls. Most accident situations are
the result of two sets of influences: (1) the technological characteristics of
the accident context, such as whether a lawn mower has an engine cutoff
device, and (2) the role of the potential accident victim. .. . Once the role
of individual action in contributing to risks is recognized, the potential
roles for regulatory intervention through an informational approach is
apparent. Altering behavior may be a more effective regulatory strategy
than is the technological approach that dominated the first decade of
social regulation in the 1970s.
MAGAT & Viscusi, supra note 113, at 4-5.
169. See generally F.A. Hayek, The Information Problem in Society, 35 Am. EcON. REV.
519 (1945) (discussing the informational difficulties inherent in centralized stan-
dard-setting); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Let 50 Flowers Bloom: Transforming




trol regime, the regulator deciding what safety control to mandate
must be privy to all sorts of time- and place-specific information in
order to know whether: (1) the benefits of the regulation outweigh its
costs, and (2) the regulation has higher net benefits than any other
available precaution. Frequently, context-specific factors will render
a precaution that is appropriate in one situation inappropriate in
others. 170 Consider, for example, the part of OSHA's proposed ergo-
nomics standard that barred employers from providing safety incen-
tives to employee groups who remain accident-free.171 The agency
reasoned that such incentives lead to underreporting of injuries,
thereby preventing management from learning of and eliminating
hazards.17 2 While this may be true for some businesses, others have
found that safety incentives are an important part of an accident re-
duction strategy. For example, the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
reported that a significant decline in ergonomic injuries at Texas In-
struments was due in large part to the company's safety incentive pro-
gram, which rewarded employee groups who avoided workplace
accidents and injuries. 1 73 The GAO specifically noted that the corpo-
rate culture at Texas Instruments favors performance incentives and
that the company's safety incentive program was likely successful for
that reason.174 Centralized regulators are not usually aware of par-
ticular circumstances like regulatees' corporate cultures, but those cir-
cumstances may greatly influence the effectiveness of a precaution
technique. Hence, a risk-disclosure regime, which permits those c10s-
170. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 658 (1993) ("Precisely because of their uniformity,
[rigid safety standards] force a wide range of actors into the same mold. In this
way, too, they diminish economic efficiency."). Cf Henry N. Butler & Jonathan
R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. REG. 23, 50 (1996) ("Federal reg-
ulators have not been, and never will be, able to acquire and assimilate the enor-
mous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments
that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution
sources.").
171. See 64 Fed. Reg. 65798 (Nov. 23, 1999) (interpreting § 1910.212(c) of proposed
ergonomics regulation to prohibit incentive programs that focus on achieving low
numbers of reported ergonomic injuries).
172. See 64 Fed. Reg. 65798 (Nov. 23, 1999) ("[T]he use of incentive or award programs
that focus on achieving low numbers of reported MSDs [musculo-skeletal disor-
ders] may discourage early reporting. Such programs, although sometimes in-
tended to improve employee safety and health, may inadvertently lead to the
underreporting of MSD cases and thus actually increase unsafe working
conditions.").
173. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO/HEHS-97-163, Worker Protec-
tion: Private Sector Ergonomics Programs Yield Positive Results 15 (1997) (noting
that "performance targets drive all corporate and facility activities at Texas In-
struments, so these kinds of targets have also been established for the facility's
ergonomics programs").
174. Id. at 15-16.
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est to the risks and most knowledgeable of local circumstances to de-
cide how the risks should be reduced, may be preferable.
Two final efficiency advantages of a disclosure regime similarly de-
rive from the fact that mandatory disclosure rules, unlike command-
and-control regulations, do not specify technological controls. First, a
disclosure approach, unlike pure paternalism, creates no disincentive
to the development of superior risk-reducing technologies. Requiring
employers to adopt particular technology-based safety standards, as
substantive safety standards typically do, will tend to discourage in-
vestment in less expensive or more effective technologies. If the gov-
ernment requires one technology to be adopted, employers will not
look for cheaper means of achieving the same risk reduction.175 By
contrast, if the government were simply to mandate disclosure of risks
and allow the market to penalize employers for the risks created, em-
ployers would have incentives to adopt all cost-effective precautions
and to engage in research on new cost-effective precautions (at least
until the point at which the private marginal benefits of research ef-
forts equaled the private marginal costs thereof).
Moreover, mandatory disclosure, unlike a regime mandating tech-
nology-based standards, does not encourage inefficient interest group
maneuvering. When Congress and the regulatory agencies are at-
tempting to specify the particular means by which workplace safety is
to be increased, they are especially vulnerable to well-organized pri-
vate groups, who attempt to promote their own welfare through ob-
taining requirements mandating safety technologies that somehow
benefit them (e.g., that they already have or that will be particularly
expensive for their competitors to adopt).176 Under a mandatory dis-
closure regime that does not impose specific technological standards,
there is no such potential for wasteful interest group wrangling.
In addition to these efficiency concerns, concern for preserving and
enhancing individual liberty argues for a disclosure regime over a
command-and-control approach. Whereas government dictation of
particular outcomes (via the imposition of substantive standards) nec-
essarily reduces individual liberty, an informational approach main-
tains, and can actually increase, individual liberty by enabling
individuals to make better-informed, and thus "freer," choices.1 77
175. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 660.
176. Id.
177. As Professor Sunstein explains:
There are two problems [with directly setting standards rather than pro-
viding information]. The first is that inadequate information is a serious
obstacle to liberty. To the extent that current approaches do not provide
information, they disservice this goal. The second problem is that gov-
ernmentally prescribed outcomes unnecessarily diminish the role of indi-
vidual decisions and choices in forming individual lives. At least across
a broad range of possibilities, people should be allowed to select their
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Thus, rights-based concerns (i.e., concern for autonomy and individual
liberty) also weigh in favor of moderate libertarianism's disclosure ap-
proach over pure paternalism's command-and-control approach.
b. Potential Shortcomings
But all may not be rosy for moderate libertarianism's mandatory
disclosure approach to workplace safety regulation. At least two po-
tential difficulties threaten the efficacy of a regulatory approach fo-
cused on ensuring risk internalization (and thus optimal precaution-
taking) by informing employees of the relative riskiness of workplaces.
First, there are potential problems stemming from employees' cogni-
tive limitations. If employees cannot adequately process information
about workplace risks, will requiring employers to provide such infor-
mation accomplish anything? Second, there may be a problem when
employees' informational deficiency is not the only information inade-
quacy leading to sub-optimal precaution-taking; when employers are
systematically under-informed about available cost-effective precau-
tions, a regulatory approach that merely mandates risk disclosure
may fail to generate efficient precaution-taking. Examination of these
two potential shortcomings demonstrates that the former is not fatal
to a moderate libertarian regime but that the latter may call for a
more intrusive role for the government in reducing certain types of job
risks.
(1) Bounded Rationality and Behavioralism
A number of theorists, relying on individuals' bounded rational-
ity178 and on the insights of behavioral economics,179 have argued
preferred mixes of risk, employment, salary, medical care, and so forth.
If their choice is irrational, or if it has large consequences for others, the
government is entitled to intervene. But the presumption should be in
favor of private choice. Because current regulatory law forecloses pri-
vate choice in favor of nationally mandated outcomes, it disserves lib-
erty, certainly in comparison to a system in which information is
provided.
Id. at 658-59.
178. 'Bounded rationality," a term coined by Herbert Simon, refers to the fact that
decisionmakers inherently have limited memories, computational skills, and
other mental skills, which in turn limit their ability to gather and process infor-
mation. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environ-
ment, in MODELS OF MAN 261, 271 (1957).
179. As explained in more detail below, see infra notes 190 to 207 and accompanying
text, behavioral economics draws on experimental economics and cognitive psy-
chology to argue that individuals systematically depart from rational decision-
making even in market settings. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Rus-
sell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
20041 1053
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that risk disclosure approaches to regulating safety and health are
destined to fail because individuals face cognitive limitations that pre-
vent them from accurately processing risk information that is pro-
vided to them. Given these limitations, the theorists reason,
individuals will fail to make "good" risk decisions (i.e., decisions that
are utility maximizing given the individuals' personal utility func-
tions) even if they have perfect risk information.1SO The cognitive lim-
itations can be divided into two categories: limitations in individuals'
abilities (1) to digest risk information, or "get it in their heads" (cogni-
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Thomas S.
Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1747 (1998).
180. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,
97 N.W.U. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (2003) (noting that individuals' tendency to under-
estimate personal risks "undermines the notion that workers can protect them-
selves by bargaining for an optimal level of safety in the workplace," so that
"workers arguably need minimal safety standards to protect them from employ-
ers who would otherwise exploit their cognitive vulnerability"); Sidney A. Shapiro
& Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice:
The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 120 (2000) (noting that in order to
demand accurate risk premiums, "workers must also be free of psychological de-
fects that distort the way in which individuals process risk information, but indi-
viduals commonly misperceive the degree of risk that they face"); Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 667-69 (discussing how cognitive quirks could limit effectiveness of
risk disclosure); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics - And
the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L. J. 341, 356 (1988) (noting that risk dis-
closure may not protect workers because of "the limited information-processing
capacities of people, especially regarding probabilistic information" and that
"[r]ather than engage in a massive educational campaign, it may be more effi-
cient to regulate workplace health and safety directly through administrative or-
ders or incentive schemes"); Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Know Laws:
Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 25 (1987) ("Since there are systematic and predictable
errors that most people make in their risk assessment, a policy directive requir-
ing employers to inform the worker of occupational risks through disclosure
under right-to-know laws will have a minimal impact."). Cf Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Ma-
nipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724-43 (1999) (arguing that cognitive quirks
prevent consumers from rationally processing product warnings and provide an
opportunity for manufacturers to manipulate consumer perceptions); Howard
Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193, 1195 (1994) (exploring behavioral claims of cognitive limitations and
arguing that product warnings will be inefficacious because "[piroduct warnings
and other disclosure mechanisms can be effective only when intended recipients
are able to receive, comprehend, and act upon the information imparted"); Robert
A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution":
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251,
291 (1991-92) (relying on behavioral research as one of a number of grounds for
favoring strict products liability).
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tive constraints) and (2) to process the risk information they do digest
(cognitive biases or irrationalities).1 8 1
In attempting to demonstrate the inefficacy of product warnings on
consumer goods, Professor Howard Latin outlined a number of cogni-
tive constraints that purportedly prevent individuals from reading
and understanding (what I am calling "digesting") all available risk
information about consumer products.' 8 2 Consumers will frequently
fail to read a warning, Professor Latin argued, because they are func-
tionally illiterate 1 83 or predictably inattentive or incompetent; 1 8 4 they
would prefer to rely on explanations by intermediaries or on their own
knowledge and experience; 18 5 or they are facing competing demands
on their time and attention 8 6 or are subject to "information over-
load."1 87 In addition, even if consumers go through the mechanical
process of reading risk information, they will frequently fail to under-
stand such information because the warning labels are unclear, over-
or under-detailed, or textually ambiguous,' 8 8 or because readers pos-
sess inadequate evaluative skills for deciphering complex warn-
ings.' 8 9 While Professor Latin's critique focused solely on product
warnings, his arguments about human cognitive constraints would
also seem to apply to the moderate libertarian regime for regulating
workplace safety. As mandatory disclosure relies on employees' read-
ing and understanding comparative workplace risk information, the
cognitive constraints Professor Latin identified would also seem to
weaken the efficacy of the moderate libertarian approach.
In addition to cognitive constraints that limit the amount of infor-
mation employees can digest (or "get into their heads"), Professor
Latin and other commentators have drawn on the insights of behav-
ioral economics to argue that even if individuals fully absorbed all
available risk information, they would still tend to misuse it.190 In
181. Roughly speaking, "cognitive constraints" refers to bounded rationality, and "cog-
nitive biases or irrationalities" refers to the supposed quirks identified by behav-
ioral economists. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 24-26 (explaining difference
between bounded rationality and systematic irrationalities identified by
behavioralists).
182. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).
183. Id. at 1207-08 (noting that 13 percent of American adults are illiterate and a
much higher proportion are functionally illiterate).
184. Id. at 1208.
185. Id. at 1209-11.
186. Id. at 1215-19.
187. Id. at 1211-15.
188. Id. at 1221-25.
189. Id. at 1226-29.
190. Professor Latin nicely summarized much of the behavioral research in a discus-
sion titled "Cognitive Heuristics and Biases." See Latin, supra note 182, at 1229-
41. He there discusses the "representativeness heuristic," the "availability heu-
ristic," cognitive dissonance, framing, anchoring, and prospect theory. Later in
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recent years, behavioral economists have conducted a number of em-
pirical studies demonstrating that individuals, when acting under
conditions of uncertainty, are not necessarily "rational self-interest
maximizers" as classical economic theory has assumedl 9 1 but are in-
stead subject to "a whole range of systematic errors and biases."192
the same article, he discusses systematic overconfidence and disregard of low-
probability risks, two other irrational phenomena behavioralist theorists have ob-
served. See id. at 1243-47.
For additional summaries of the irrational biases behavioralists have ob-
served and the implications for warning policies, see SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON,
supra note 81, at 261-64; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.
2000); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180 (reviewing behavioral literature and dis-
cussing the implications for products liability law); Frank B. Cross, The Public
Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887 (1994) (discussing behavioral insights on
individuals' risk processing abilities and the implications for public risk control
policies).
191. The notion that individuals are rational self-interest maximizers-the "rational
choice model" of human behavior-is a well-established feature of classical eco-
nomic theory. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 640-44 (discussing the
dominance of the rational choice model in economic theory and the origins of be-
havioral research challenging the model). Professor Robert Ellickson has tersely
summarized the model as follows:
The economists' model, in its purest form, is based on elegantly simple
propositions about both cognitive capacities and motivations. The model
assumes that a person can perfectly process available information about
alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of
expected utility. The model assumes that an actor will choose the course
of action that will maximize personal expected utility ....
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989).
The rational choice model gained a firm foothold in economic theory after the
publication of mathematician John von Neumann's and Oskar Morgenstern's
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944, which attempted to
elaborate axioms of how individuals make rational, utility-maximizing decisions
in the face of uncertainty. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 640-45 (dis-
cussing the importance of JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY
OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) and noting that, after its publication,
"economists began to assume [the] descriptive accuracy" of the rational choice
model).
192. J. St B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHIL-
OSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 6, 6 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (discussing
paradox of individual rationality and bias). The literature documenting system-
atic irrational biases on the part of individuals has become quite voluminous. In
addition to the articles cited in note 179, supra, which summarize much of the
behavioral research, an interested reader should consult ROBYN M. DAWES, RA-
TIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1988); DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE,
NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988); IN-
SIGHTS IN DECISION MAKING: A TRIBUTE TO HILLEL J. EINHORN (Robin M. Hogarth
ed., 1990); JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Hal
R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds. 1986); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT &
LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDG-
MENT (1980). For additional literature reviews, see ScoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOL-
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While a full exploration of these systematic irrationalities is beyond
the purview of this Article, it is worth briefly considering the main
categories of purported biases to see how they might impair a risk dis-
closure regime: 19 3
(1) Status Quo/Loss Aversion Biases and Framing Effects. A num-
ber of theorists have observed that people have a tendency to weigh
losses more heavily than gains and may thus be less willing to assume
risk when facing the loss of something they have than when poten-
tially gaining something they do not have.1 9 4 This tendency, which
produces a natural bias toward the status quo, 19 5 suggests that
whether options are "framed" in terms of potential gains or losses af-
fects decisions even though the framing may be completely arbitrary
and manipulable.19 6 Moreover, it manifests itself in a tendency for
people to demand more to sell something they own than they would
pay to buy the same item, a tendency referred to as the "endowment
effect."19 7 To the extent that individual reasoning is infected with
OGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING (1993); Colin F. Camerer, Individual
Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel
& Alvin E. Roth eds. 1995); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998).
193. The summary presented here is based on categories organized by Professor Don-
ald Langevoort. See Langevoort, supra note 179, at 1503-05.
194. See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 673-76 (discussing status quo
bias and endowment effect and empirical evidence thereof). See also Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-201 (1991) (explaining
how preference for status quo derives in part from finding that losses and gains of
equal amount do not have identical impact on decisions but rather that losses
generally exert stronger impact).
195. Professor Russell Korobkin has demonstrated the status quo bias in an experi-
ment involving the reaction of first year law students to a hypothetical contrac-
tual setting in which they were asked to advise a shipping company during
negotiations with a commercial customer. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 634-41 (1998). By
changing the applicable contract default rule between subjects, Korobkin found
that the "subjects exhibited a large and statistically significant bias in favor of
the term embedded in the default rule-the status quo term." Id. at 639.
196. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 684-87 (discussing framing effects);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 89 AM. Psy-
CHOLOGIST 341 (1984) (demonstrating, in a widely cited study of preferences for
alternative hypothetical vaccine programs, that whether an option is framed as a
loss or a gain affects the desirability of the option); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453 (1981) (finding significant changes in preferences based on seemingly incon-
sequential changes in formulation of choice problems).
197. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1330 (1990) (well-known study documenting endowment effect); George Lowen-
stein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929, 931
(1995)(discussing experiment demonstrating that willingness to accept values are
greater than willingness to pay values).
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these biases, risk disclosure regimes may be difficult, for individuals
may undervalue safety benefits they do not yet possess (i.e., they will
not be willing to give up enough ex ante compensation in exchange for
the employers' adoption of a safety measure that they would value
more if it were required and was thus, in a sense, "theirs").19 8
(2) Anchoring and Adjustment. Another set of behavioral observa-
tions is that individuals "anchor" on some initial possibility in the
decisionmaking process, typically the status quo, and fail to adjust
properly as new information becomes available.19 9 Moreover, an ad-
justment that does occur may be overly affected by the salience or re-
cency of the data-i.e., recent information that is widely reported or
"hits close to home" is weighed too heavily. 200 This set of biases may
affect a disclosure regime in one of two ways: The anchoring bias sug-
gests that individuals will not be properly swayed by accurate risk
information if they have already "anchored" onto an idea about how
safe a particular workplace is; conversely, the salience or "availability"
bias suggests that individuals will be too heavily influenced by new,
readily available information, such as a high-profile workplace acci-
dent in the area.
(3) Illusory Correlations and Causation Biases. Individuals often
irrationally infer causal patterns and relationships from events that
are the result of random chance. 20 1 They therefore tend to ignore sta-
tistical base rates in favor of highly salient or available, but less pre-
dictive, information. Obviously, this tendency would limit the
effectiveness of a regulatory regime focused on informing people of
statistical risks.
(4) Irrationalities With Respect to Low Probability Risks. Empiri-
cal evidence shows that individuals tend, on the one hand, to ignore
198. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 104-13 (1993)
(arguing that endowment effect may call for increased role for the government in
shaping individual preferences).
199. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 667-69 (discussing empirical evidence of
anchoring biases); TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 192, at 14-15 (discussing studies demonstrating anchoring effects).
200. This bias is frequently termed the "availability heuristic." According to Tversky
and Kahneman, who coined the term, "a person... employs the availability heu-
ristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which in-
stances or associations could be brought to mind." Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). For discussions of evidence demonstrating
the existence of the bias, see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 180, at 662-64 (discuss-
ing availability heuristic); SusAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNI-
TION 142-79, 245-94 (2d ed. 1991) (providing general review of availability
heuristic in contexts of social schemas and social encoding).
201. See Langevoort, supra note 179, at 1504; Loren J. Chapman, Illusory Correlation




low probability risks that are not otherwise made salient and, on the
other hand, to display an irrationally strong preference for the elimi-
nation of uncertainty (e.g., to value risk reduction from five to zero
percent significantly more than a reduction from ten to five per-
cent).20 2 As a risk disclosure regime seems to depend on individuals
rationally processing information about what are generally low
probability risks, these biases would seem to cause problems for the
moderate libertarian, disclosure-based regime.
(5) Egocentric Biases (False Self Confidence). A number of biases
fall under the heading "egocentric." For example, individuals tend to
engage in self-serving explanations, attributing successes to efficiency
or control and failures to luck or other external circumstances. 20 3
They also tend to overestimate the extent to which others share their
attitudes and beliefs (the "false consensus" effect), and, in assessing
what is "fair," they appear biased toward their self-interest. The most
important egocentric bias for purposes of evaluating a risk disclosure
regime is the first one mentioned: The tendency to attribute successes
to individual control bestows on individuals a false self-confidence-a
belief that they can "beat the odds." Falsely self-confident individuals
will, of course, discount objective risks of which they are informed,
even if the risks are ones over which they really have no control.
(6) Hindsight, Context, and Intertemporal Biases. The remaining
frequently mentioned biases do not seem directly damaging to a risk
disclosure regime, but I will briefly mention them anyway, for they
provide additional evidence that individuals are not rational self-in-
terest maximizers. The hindsight bias is the name given to people's
tendency to overestimate the extent to which they could have pre-
dicted some future event (i.e., its foreseeability) once they learn what
actually happened. 20 4 Context bias refers to the tendency for individ-
ual choices to be unduly affected by the availability of alternatives,
particularly if they involve compromise possibilities. 20 5 Intertemporal
biases stem from individuals' tendency to discount future risks and
rewards more heavily than standard economic analysis would predict,
suggesting a bias toward consumption and against deferred
gratification.2 06
As noted, the common thread running through these behavioral ob-
servations is irrationality. They tend to disprove the rational choice
202. See Langevoort, supra note 179, at 1504; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON,
supra note 81, at 261 (noting that individuals "have a notoriously difficult time
thinking about low probability events").
203. See Langevoort, supra note 179, at 1505.
204. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind-
sight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
205. See supra note 179, at 1505; SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 190, at 3-4.
206. See Langevoort, supra note 179, at 1505.
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model of human behavior, upon which much of classical economic the-
ory-including, according to some, the theory of compensating differ-
entials2O7-is based. More importantly for our purposes, however,
they suggest that individuals are particularly bad at processing risk
information.
Bounded rationality and behavioralism thus present what seems,
on first glance, a formidable challenge to moderate libertarianism's
disclosure-based approach: If individual employees cannot digest and
process risk information in order to make decisions that are in their
best interests given their personal utility functions-and particularly
if they tend, as behavioralism suggests, to discount their personal
risks-then merely providing employees with risk information will not
lead to a sufficient reduction in workplace injuries because employees
either will ignore the information or will continue to accept overly
risky jobs, believing that they can somehow "beat the odds." To the
extent employees systematically miscalculate their subjective risk
even when provided with accurate objective risk information, a
mandatory disclosure approach would seem doomed to fail.
This argument assumes, however, that the only goal of mandatory
disclosure is to assist employees in making "good" decisions (i.e., deci-
sions that comport with their personal utility functions) about what
risks to accept. In actuality, the moderate libertarian approach has
another, perhaps more important rationale, which is achievable even
if individuals routinely misprocess the risk information that is pro-
vided to them.
Indeed, there are two primary rationales for a mandatory disclo-
sure approach to workplace safety regulation. One is based on con-
cerns for individual rights and liberties and rests on the notion of
informed consent. Mandating risk disclosure preserves an employee's
individual rights and liberties by ensuring that she does not unwit-
tingly undertake risks of which she is not informed in advance. 208
The employee's liberty interests are protected because providing infor-
mation to guide her employment decisions makes those choices "freer,"
and by enhancing the employee's ability to make free choices, informa-
tion-provision respects her sovereignty and individual rights. The lib-
erty/rights rationale thus depends on the information-provision
approach's ability to help employees make the type of decisions they
really want to make.
207. See Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2003) ("The basic theory of'compensating differentials'-
the idea that certain jobs pay more than equally skilled jobs if they are atypically
dangerous or boring or unpleasant-can be derived almost entirely from basic
bedrock assumptions about the behavior of rational maximizers.").
208. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 658-69 (arguing that risk disclosure enhances
liberty and the right to self-determination).
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The second rationale for mandatory disclosure, which by now
should be quite familiar, is efficiency-based: When employees have
accurate risk information, they will demand premiums (i.e., compen-
sating differentials) that compensate them for the risks to which they
are exposed, and those risks will thereby be internalized to the em-
ployer, who will be in a better position to decide whether particular
precautions that would eliminate the risks are cost-justified. When
employees demand accurate compensating differentials, employers
have an incentive to take all-and only-those precautions that are
less costly than the risks they reduce, resulting in an efficient level of
precaution-taking.
There is no doubt that bounded rationality and the insights of
behavioralism damage the former (i.e., rights/liberty) rationale for a
mandatory disclosure approach. If individual employees are unable to
process risk information or are subject to systematic biases in inter-
preting or processing risk information-say, for example, that they
have an optimistic bias or "false self-confidence"-then they may still
make decisions that are unwise or irrational given their utility func-
tions, despite the fact that accurate risk information has been
presented. Providing risk information therefore does not necessarily
make employees' choices freer, more consistent with their personal
utility functions, or, in other words, more "self-actualized." Thus, the
rights/liberty rationale for an information-provision approach may be
weakened.
But critics who marshal behavioral insights and the notion of
bounded rationality to argue that the moderate libertarian approach
is doomed to failure are focusing on only the rights/liberty-enhancing
function of disclosure. The efficiency benefits of the mandatory disclo-
sure strategy may be attainable even if employees are subject to cogni-
tive limitations and biases that prohibit them from rationally
processing risk information. That is because the efficiency benefits of
a risk disclosure regime do not require that employees who receive
risk information actually make job decisions that comport with their
personal utility functions, only that their employers be "penal-
ized"according to the risks the employees do decide to accept.
As noted, it is not necessary that every employee, or even a major-
ity of employees, be aware of relative risk information in order for the
employer to have to pay compensating differentials, for wage rates,
including risk premiums, are determined by the demands of marginal
employees. 20 9 Thus, as long as marginal employees are able to digest
the relative risk information and are not overly optimistic about their
abilities to avoid risks (and as long as wage discrimination is impracti-
209. See Henry N. Butler & Keith W. Chauvin, Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A
Framework for Analyzing Employment Law Issues, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-
4 (1999); GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 106-09 (1996).
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cable), the wage rate will adjust to account for the relative riskiness of
the workplace. A substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates
that individuals are not equally bounded in their rationality or uni-
formly beset by the cognitive quirks identified by the behavioralists;
indeed, many individuals appear to act rationally in processing risk
information. 210 And, of course, marginal employees-the employees
most likely to decline a job offer or to quit in response to risks for
which they are not compensated-are precisely the employees one
would expect to (1) pay most attention to relative risk information,
and (2) not be irrationally optimistic regarding their abilities to "beat
the odds." Thus, employers may have to pay for disclosed risks even if
most employees-the non-marginal employees-do not digest and ac-
curately process the risk information provided to them. Just as the
efforts of searchers protect non-searchers under the search equilib-
rium model,2 1l the superior reasoning abilities-of marginal employees
may protect employees facing more extensive cognitive limitations
and biases.
Moreover, neither bounded rationality nor the irrationalities pur-
portedly demonstrated by the behavioralists poses an insurmountable
barrier to a regulatory regime based on informing employees of work-
place risks. With respect to bounded rationality, individuals' difficul-
ties in digesting risk information could be addressed by tailoring the
disclosure rules to overcome the particular barriers that prevent peo-
ple from examining the risk information that is presented to them.
For example, concerns about excessive detail or information overload
210. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO.
L. J. 67, 86-105 (2002) (summarizing the "growing body of empirical research
demonstrating that individuals vary widely, and predictably, in their propensi-
ties to act rationally"); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?
The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 1907, 1945 (2002) ("In fact, when one examines the actual data
gathered by decision researchers rather than just summary presentations of the
data, one finds that at least a significant minority and often a significant major-
ity of the subjects provided the 'right,' or rational, answer to the judgment or
decision problem under consideration."); William H. Riker, The Political Psychol-
ogy of Rationale Choice Theory, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 23, 36 (1995) ("None of the
experiments displaying inconsistencies in choice portray all subjects as inconsis-
tent. For experimenters to recommend the abandonment of expected utility the-
ory when the experiments themselves show that many people - often well over
half, as in the preference reversal experiments - are indeed expected utility maxi-
mizers is to ignore the evidence that the experimenters have themselves cre-
ated."); Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich, The Domain Specificity and
Generality of Overconfidence: Individual Differences in Performance Estimation
Bias, 4 PSYCHONOMIc BULL. & REV. 387, 387 (1997) ("Despite this overall finding
of overconfidence on many tasks, performance across a sample of participants is
almost always characterized by enormous variability. It is almost always the case
that some participants show no global bias toward overconfidence.").
211. See supra notes 125 to 128 and accompanying text.
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could be addressed by requiring the risk information to be presented
in a simple, straightforward manner. Indeed, the simple comparative
risk forms presented above, modeled after the required energy-effi-
ciency labels, would seem to address concerns about textual ambigu-
ity, excessive detail, and information overload. Employee inattention
could be addressed by requiring employers to obtain employees' signa-
tures next to the diagrams presenting the comparative risk informa-
tion, much the way sales contracts often require buyers to initial
particularly important sections of agreements, such as insurance
waivers, in order to guarantee informed consent. Employee incompe-
tence and functional illiteracy could be addressed by requiring em-
ployers to obtain proof that they had presented the risk information to
employees in an understandable fashion. (For example, employees
could be required to sign a statement certifying that they understood
the risk information.) In short, cognitive constraints-limitations on
individuals' abilities to digest risk information-could be addressed by
tweaking the details of disclosure rules.
The irrationalities purportedly demonstrated by the behavioralists
also fail to impair the efficiency benefits of a risk disclosure regime.
Such benefits are attainable even if employees systematically discount
the risks to them of taking a particular job, because they will still de-
mand a risk premium for job risks incurred, and that premium will be
based on objective job risks. The behavioralist model, after all, at-
tacks only one aspect of the "rational choice" model underlying classi-
cal economics: Whereas that model posits that individuals are
rational self-interest maximizers, behavioralism claims only that indi-
viduals are systematically irrational. Behavioralism does not main-
tain that individuals systematically fail to maximize what they
perceive to be their self-interest. They are, under the behavioral
model, irrational self-interest maximizers, but self-interest maximiz-
ers nonetheless. Hence, the behavioral model suggests that individu-
als, because they irrationally discount risks, may take risks that are
"too large" (given their personal tastes for risk), but it in no way im-
plies that they will not attempt to maximize their self-interest by de-
manding the highest level of compensation they can obtain for
accepting those risks. In other words, the fact that individuals irra-
tionally think they can beat the odds does not prevent them from de-
manding compensation for taking objective risks, and, as long as
employers are unable to tell which prospective employees irrationally
discount risks212 (so that they cannot wage discriminate against those
212. As noted, empirical evidence shows that individuals are not equally beset by the
cognitive constraints and biases noted by the behavioralists and that a substan-
tial proportion of individuals rationally process risk information. See supra note
210 and accompanying text. If employers cannot tell which employees are ra-
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employees), employees will be able to extract risk premiums that are
reflective of objective risks.213
An example may help illustrate how risk premiums will be tied to
objective risk levels, even if employees irrationally discount those
risks and therefore accept jobs that are "too risky." Suppose the uni-
verse of possible employers consists of three widget-makers: Erl, Er2,
and Er3. Erl is the lowest risk widget-maker-the lowest risk
endpoint on the comparative risk information given to prospective em-
ployees-with an injury/illness rate of zero. With a zero injury rate,
the risk of working for Erl is x (where x > 0 because there will still be
some statistical risk, even if there has never been an injury or illness
at Erl's facility). Er2 has a higher injury rate, and the risk of working
at his facility is, say, x + 1. Er3 has an even higher injury rate-the
highest risk endpoint on the comparative risk information presented
to prospective employees-and the risk of his job is x + 2. For each
employer, the rational risk premium employees should demand, y,
is a function of the objective risk. So, yl =f(x); y2 =fix + 1); and
y3 =fAx + 2). Obviously, yl < y2 < y3.
Now suppose a prospective employee ("Ee") applies for a job at Er3
(the highest risk employer) and is given the comparative risk informa-
tion the moderate libertarian approach would mandate.2 14 Also sup-
pose, as the behavioralists would assert, that Ee irrationally discounts
his personal risk, despite the objective comparative risk data. In fact,
suppose Ee, because of the "optimism" and "false self-confidence" bi-
ases, 2 15 discounts his personal risk to x-the residual risk level one
would face working at a job where no one had ever reported an injury
or illness. Under these assumptions, Ee would believe that, for him,
there is no difference in working for Er3 or Erl (the lowest risk em-
ployer); because he believes himself capable of beating the odds, the
jobs are equivalent in his mind.
But Ee, despite his tendency to mishandle risk information (i.e., to
discount his personal risks), is still a wealth-maximizer, who wants to
get as much as he can for doing his job. Thus, in negotiating his salary
tional processors of risk information, they will have to take seriously any em-
ployee threat to leave if not compensated for objective risks.
213. The point here is that, even if employees are irrational about risk and are likely
to discount their personal risk to zero, they will, as long as they are also utility-
maximizers, charge the highest rate they can charge for their work. And employ-
ers, unable to distinguish rational from irrational employees, will agree to pay
accurate risk premiums in order not to lose employees (i.e., those that are not
irrationally optimistic regarding their personal risks) to less risky employers.
Thus, ceteris paribus, riskier employers will end up having to pay more than less
risky employers, and the desirable incentive effects of a mandatory disclosure
regime are preserved.
214. See infra Figure H.
215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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with Er3, he will, knowing there are other employers who offer the
same job with objectively less risk, demand a risk premium of y3. Er3,
however, knowing that individuals are generally subject to cognitive
biases and that Ee therefore likely discounts his subjective risk, might
offer to pay only yl (the minimum any employer could pay), and one
might initially think that Ee would accept this offer, for Ee really per-
ceives that his subjective risk is only x. But, given that Ee is still a
wealth - maximizer (despite the fact that he is irrational about risk),
he will know that he could credibly threaten to reject Er3's offer in
favor of a job with Erl, which would provide him with the same wage
rate (wages plus yl) with less objective risk. Even though Ee himself
perceives no difference between Er3's job and Erl's (because he irra-
tionally discounts Er3's risk), his threat to go with Erl will be credible
as long as there are a sufficient number of employees who would legit-
imately prefer Erl's lower risk job to Er3's job, all else being equal,
and Er3 cannot tell whether Ee is one of those employees. 2 16 Thus, in
order to attract Ee, Er3 will raise his risk premium above yl. Simi-
larly, he will raise his risk premium above y2 in order to woo Ee away
from Er2. (Otherwise, Ee would credibly threaten to refuse Er3's job in
favor of Er2's.) When this entire process has run its course, the riski-
est employer will end up paying a risk premium greater than that
paid by the next riskiest employer, even if the employee perceives the
two employers' jobs to be equally attractive. 2 17 Thus, a risk disclosure
regime will result in employers' being penalized for risk, even if many
or most employees are beset by cognitive quirks that cause them to
discount their personal risks.
In addition, the presence of labor unions in the negotiating process
will tend to ensure that risk premiums are high enough to reflect ob-
jective risk, even if individual employees make poor risk decisions.
For many risky jobs, unions will play a key role in negotiating worker
wages, and unions presumably are not susceptible to the cognitive
limitations and biases that beset individual employees. 2 18 Hence, un-
216. See supra notes 210, 212, and accompanying text.
217. But will the risk premium Er3 ultimately ends up paying be big enough? That is,
will the risk premium reach y3-the level necessary to provide full compensation
for the risks imposed? Yes, as long as (1) there is a critical mass of employees
that are not irrational with respect to risk and thus would not accept the job for a
risk premium less than y3, see supra note 210; (2) conditions of supply and de-
mand are such that the employer has to hire some of those employees in order to
operate at her desired productivity level; and (3) the employer is unable to distin-
guish rational employees from those that irrationally discount their personal
risks. In such circumstances, prospective employees' threats not to accept the job
unless paid a risk premium of y3 will be credible, and the employer will end up
paying the premium even to those employees that discount their personal risks.
218. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. REG. 53, 59 (1984) (noting that
"many large unions have specialized expertise on risk issues and possess the bar-
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ions-rational agents-will determine the wage rate, accurately tak-
ing into account the objective risk information, and individual
employees-quasi-rational agents-will decide merely whether or not
to accept the job. Employees may tend to be too willing to accept the
job at the given wage because of optimism biases (the belief that they
can beat the odds), etc., but because of the negotiating efforts of un-
ions, they will at least be compensated for the risks they really bear
and those risks will therefore be internalized.
(2) Failure to Remedy Employers' Informational
Deficiency
A second potential shortcoming of moderate libertarianism's risk
disclosure approach is that it addresses only one type of informational
inadequacy leading to sub-optimal precaution-taking: insufficient risk
information on the part of employees. The moderate libertarian ap-
proach does not deal with the problem of employers' remaining ration-
ally ignorant of available cost-effective precautions, a problem that
may persist despite the fact that workers are fully informed of risks
and therefore demand adequate compensating differentials. Even if
sufficiently motivated to take all cost-effective precautions to reduce
workplace risks, employers will not do so if they are ignorant of some
such precautions, and they will tend to remain ignorant of workplace
safety precautions that appear to cost more to research and develop
than they would likely benefit any individual employer.2 19 For exam-
ple, even if employees knew all there were to know about ergonomic
risks and therefore demanded an adequate compensating differential
for accepting such risks, employers would still not adopt all cost-effec-
tive means of reducing ergonomic risks if, due to the high costs and
limited individual benefits of developing measures to develop ergo-
nomic injuries, employers had under-invested in safety research and
were thus ignorant of methods by which ergonomic risks could be cost-
effectively abated. Thus, moderate libertarianism's singular focus on
informing employees of risks may fail to generate optimal precaution-
taking on the part of employers. The approach addresses the motiva-
tional obstacle to optimal precaution-taking (i.e., it ensures that em-
ployees demand adequate risk premiums and thereby motivate
employers to take all cost-effective precautions), but it does not ad-
dress the employer ignorance obstacle.
gaining power to exact wage premiums and health precautions from employers"
and observing that unionized workers receive "much higher risk premiums"); W.
Kip Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE
254-57 (1979) (documenting effectiveness of unions in using hazard information
to extract risk premiums or safety measures).
219. See supra notes 98 to 100 and accompanying text.
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That obstacle will exist, however, only in situations where the ex-
pected cost of developing a precaution is less than the expected indi-
vidual benefit provided by that precaution. When the employer's
expected individual benefit exceeds her expected costs, as will gener-
ally be the case with obvious risks that require relatively simple tech-
nological fixes, the employer will produce the precaution information
without government intervention. 220 In many cases, then, employers
will not face a systematic informational deficiency that renders the
moderate libertarian approach ineffective.
C. Moderate Paternalism: Mandatory Risk Disclosure Plus
"Encouragement" of Particular Precautions
To the extent that employers' ignorance of available cost-effective
precautions, rather than merely their lack of incentive to adopt such
precautions, precludes optimal precaution-taking, a regulatory strat-
egy in which the government discovers and encourages employers to
take particular precautions (in addition to requiring employers to dis-
close risks)2 2 1 may be preferable. As noted above, this would be a
moderate paternalist approach, for unlike the moderate libertarian
approach, it would involve the government acting as a parent (by en-
couraging certain precaution activity), but it would not mandate the
adoption of particular precautions, as occurs under the purely pater-
nalist status quo.
1. Structuring a Moderate Paternalist Approach
The key issue in implementing moderate paternalism is how to
cheaply but effectively convey precaution information to employers.
The least activist (and least costly) approach would be to initiate a
simple research and development program in which the government
attempted to discover potential cost-effective safety precautions and
made its findings available to interested employers. 222 Under such an
approach, the government would not actively disseminate information
about available precautions but would instead simply make that infor-
220. See supra notes 101 to 102 and accompanying text.
221. A moderate paternalist strategy of encouraging employers to adopt particular
precautions should supplement, not supplant, a mandatory risk disclosure re-
gime. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that when employer
education regarding available cost-effective precautions is desirable, employee
education regarding relative risks will also be desirable).
222. The costs of this type of program would likely be lower than more ambitious pro-
grams under which the government would disseminate its findings to employers,
for the government would not bear the dissemination costs, and, while employers
would have to expend resources to obtain the information the government had
created, their costs of doing so would probably be less than the government's
costs of engaging in general dissemination, for only interested employers-those
most likely to use the information-would make efforts to access the information.
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mation available through, for example, pilot projects that interested
employees could observe or information clearinghouses that they
could access. 22 3 Simple research and development may not succeed in
effectively providing employers with precaution information, however,
because the burden would rest on employers to seek out the informa-
tion, and employers frequently do not even know they are failing to
engage in optimal precaution-taking.
Regulators might therefore opt to directly disseminate to all rele-
vant employers the government's findings regarding available cost-ef-
fective precautions. Regulators take this type of approach when they
promulgate voluntary guidelines. 224 For example, OSHA's voluntary
ergonomics guidelines for the meat-packing industry2 25 amounted to
"advice" from the government to employers about potential cost-sav-
ing safety precautions meat-packers might implement. Given that
employers must ultimately pay for workplace risks through workers'
compensation and risk premiums, direct dissemination of information
about available precautions, coupled with risk disclosure to ensure ad-
equate risk premiums, would seem sufficient to generate optimal pre-
caution-taking on the part of employers. 22 6
The potential problem with this direct dissemination approach is
that, absent some kind of carrot or stick with which to motivate em-
ployers to take the information presented seriously, it is difficult for
regulatory agencies to achieve meaningful communication of potential
precautions. After all, information about available safety precautions
is usually boring and technical, and busy employers, deluged with all
sorts of information from a variety of sources, are likely to ignore it.
223. Recently, OSHA has provided clearinghouses of information related to a number
of safety risks and available precautions. For example, the agency's website now
includes information on precautions related to, inter alia, automated external
defibrillators, bloodborne pathogens, ergonomics, and heat stress. See U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Compliance Assistance, available at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compli
anceassistance/index.html. In addition, the agency posts information about
available industry-specific precautions. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Industry-Spe-
cific Resources, at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance-assistance/industry.html
(last viewed on May 1, 2004).
224. See, e.g., U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Ergonomics Pro-
gram Management Guidelines for Meatpacking Plants, available at http://www.
ergoweb.com/resources/reference/guidelines/meatpacking.cfm (voluntary guide-
lines issued in 1991); U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Ergo-
nomics for the Prevention of Musculoskeletal Disorders: Guidelines for Poultry
Processing, available at http://www.osha.gov/ergonomics/guidelines/poultrypro
cessing! (voluntary guidelines issued May 30, 2003).
225. See Ergonomics Program Management Guidelines for Meatpacking Plants, supra
note 224.
226. For example, as meat-packers must ultimately pay for ergonomic injuries, provid-
ing their employees with risk information and them with information about ways
to reduce ergonomic injuries would seem to be enough to motivate them to imple-
ment all cost-effective steps to reduce injuries.
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In addition, even if employers were to take time to examine the infor-
mation provided, they would be likely, given the long history of antag-
onism between private employers and regulatory agencies, 22 7 to view
it with skepticism. They may see it as a subtle attempt by regulators
to wrest control of business processes.
Regulators might therefore choose to provide precaution informa-
tion along with some incentive that would increase the likelihood that
employers would give the information its due regard. For example,
regulators might reward managers who attended a precaution train-
ing session or penalize managers who refused to attend such a gather-
ing.228 The government could thereby ensure that employers at least
digested the information about available precautions and did not sim-
ply ignore it.
Of course, such an "information-plus-incentive" approach would
cost more to implement than would a direct dissemination approach.
First, there would be the cost of providing a reward or imposing a pen-
alty. While some rewards (such as a waiver of safety inspections for
some period of time) and some penalties (such as cutting off certain
subsidies or tax credits) would actually conserve government re-
sources, most rewards or penalties would impose some cost on the gov-
ernment.22 9 In addition, the need to monitor whether employers had
paid proper attention to the information presented would require the
government to engage in relatively costly forms of information dissem-
ination. For example, regulators could not simply mail out packets
containing precaution information, as there would be no way to deter-
mine which employers actually read and digested the information in
the packets. An information-plus-incentive approach, then, would re-
quire the government to present the information in a relatively re-
source-intensive fashion-for example, in monitored training
sessions-and would thereby impose greater administrative costs
227. According to a survey of small businesspeople, OSHA is the second most "frus-
trating" federal agency to deal with. The Internal Revenue Service is first. See
Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19, at 52.
228. In recent years, OSHA has become more receptive to the idea of providing incen-
tives to employers who carefully consider OSHA's recommended precautions. For
example, the "OSHA Strategic Partnership Program for Worker Safety and
Health," adopted in November 1998, provides for rewards for firms that "partner"
with OSHA in developing plans for achieving safety improvements. See U.S.
Dep't of Labor, What Is an OSHA Partnership?, available at http'//www.osha.gov/
fso/vpp/partnership/what-is.html (last viewed on May 1, 2004). Among the in-
centives OSHA offers in exchange for permitting it a close advisory role are pen-
alty reductions and targeted, rather than general, inspections. See U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Incentives and Enforcement in Partnerships, available at http://www.osha.
gov/fso/vpp/partnership/incentives/html (last viewed on May 1, 2004).
229. Some of the incentive awards offered through the OSHA Partnership program
(e.g., targeted and reduced inspections) would conserve government resources.
Others (e.g., penalty reductions) would reduce them. See supra note 228.
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than a direct dissemination approach. The net benefits of an informa-
tion-plus-incentive approach, however, may be greater than those of
direct dissemination, for information-plus-incentive would probably
be more effective at meaningfully communicating precaution informa-
tion to employers and would therefore be more likely to motivate opti-
mal precaution-taking by employers.
Because all the moderate paternalist options discussed so far focus
exclusively on providing precaution information to employers, they
would not address the other informational deficiency leading to an
inefficient level of precaution-taking in the workplace-i.e., inade-
quate risk information on the part of employees-and thus would re-
quire separate implementation of a risk disclosure requirement. 2 30
Regulators might therefore explore ways to lower the administrative
costs of informational regulation by adopting a regulatory strategy
that would accomplish both information-provision objectives simulta-
neously. They might, for example, impose "opt-out regulations." An
opt-out regulation would specify a particular cost-effective precaution
an employer must take unless she opts out of complying with the rule
by notifying her current and prospective employees of (1) the hazard
the precaution would address, (2) the nature of the precaution at issue
and the fact that the government has recommended it, and (3) the fact
that she is opting out of compliance with the rule. Opt-out regula-
tions, then, would be presumptively mandatory but could be waived if
the employer were to document that she had made the notifications
necessary to opt out of compliance.
Such regulations would thus occupy a middle ground between di-
rect dissemination of precaution information (e.g., OSHA's voluntary
ergonomics guidelines for meat-packers)2 31 and mandatory regula-
tions (e.g., OSHA's proposed ergonomics standard).23 2 They would be
significantly more informative than direct dissemination campaigns,
for they would force employers, who would have to make a calculated
choice about whether to implement the precautions at issue, to give
the recommended precautions serious consideration. They would also
ensure that employees are informed of any risks that employers de-
clined to reduce by adopting the waiveable safety measures. They
would therefore tend to move an employer to adopt all, but only, cost-
effective precautions, because the employer's choice would be either:
(1) to comply with the regulation, which she would do if she believed
the precaution would save more in injury costs and risk premiums
than it would cost to implement, or (2) to notify, which she would do
230. See supra notes 114, 221, and accompanying text (explaining that a moderate
paternalist approach should generally include a risk disclosure element as well
as an employer education element).
231. See supra note 224.
232. 64 Fed. Reg. 65768 (Nov. 23, 1999).
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when the sum of expected injury compensation and risk premiums
(which would tend to rise as employees learned more about risks and
untaken precautions) was less than the cost of compliance. If the sub-
stantive requirements of an opt-out regulation were truly cost-effec-
tive, as they certainly should be if they are going to be mandated by
the government, then employers would tend to adopt them volunta-
rily-that is, they would choose not to opt out. Employers who could
not cheaply comply and for whom the expected savings in injury costs
were less than the costs of compliance, however, would not be forced to
adopt an inefficient precaution as long as they provided the informa-
tion that would ensure that they ended up paying (in the form of risk
premiums) the full costs of risks they impose. Hence, opt-out regula-
tions could provide a way to remedy both employees' and employers'
informational deficiencies in a cost-effective fashion.
2. Evaluation of Moderate Paternalism
A moderate paternalist regulatory option will generally cost more
to implement than the moderate libertarian approach because moder-
ate paternalism's employer education will be pursued in addition to
moderate libertarianism's employee education. 23 3 But moderate pa-
ternalism will likely cost less than a pure paternalist, command-and-
control regime because moderate paternalism's flexibility allows it to
retain several of the efficiency advantages moderate libertarianism
holds over command-and-control. 2 34 The key questions for evaluation
purposes, then, are (1) in what situations will the added benefits mod-
erate paternalism provides relative to moderate libertarianism out-
weigh the additional costs of the more activist regime, and (2) in what
situations will the added benefits pure paternalism provides, relative
233. See supra note 221 (explaining that employer education regarding precautions
typically is necessary only where employees are systematically under-informed of
risks).
234. For example, because moderate paternalism, like moderate libertarianism, al-
lows less risk-averse employees to contract with employers for whom risk reduc-
tion is expensive to allow risks to remain (in exchange for increased
compensation), it permits gains from trade that an inflexible command-and-con-
trol regime would prohibit. See supra notes 164 to 167 and accompanying text.
In addition, moderate paternalism does not inflexibly prescribe particular tech-
nologies and thus does not inhibit technological innovation the way pure pater-
nalism does, and moderate paternalism's flexibility decreases its ability to impose
competitive barriers and, accordingly, its tendency to induce wasteful interest
group maneuvering. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Moderate pa-
ternalism's flexibility also lowers the information requirement of the strategy rel-
ative to that of inflexible command-and-control. Because command-and-control
prescriptions are inflexible, regulators must predict whether they will work well
in a many different situations. See supra notes 169 to 174 and accompanying
text. By contrast, regulators need not foresee each possible application of a rule if
the rule is flexible and may be ignored in cases in which it misfires.
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to moderate paternalism, justify incurring command-and-control's ad-
ditional costs? The answers to these questions determine the contours
of the "window" in which moderate paternalism will be the optimal
regulatory strategy.
a. Vis-&-vis Moderate Libertarianism
When private employers are sufficiently motivated to engage in re-
search and development of workplace precautions, they will likely pos-
sess a comparative advantage over the government in discovering
cost-effective safety precautions. That is because government regula-
tors are typically far removed from workplace processes and are unfa-
miliar with the time- and place-specific factors that render a
precaution workable or unworkable.235 Private managers, by con-
trast, are quite familiar with the designs of their workplaces and will
generally be more efficient at crafting cost-effective precautions. Gov-
ernment involvement in discovering and encouraging particular pre-
cautions, then, should generally be limited to those situations in
which private employers are insufficiently motivated to take up the
task themselves. 2 36
As noted above, employers will be adequately motivated to engage
in research and development of safety precautions when the expected
cost of developing the precautions is exceeded by the expected benefits
to individual employers. 23 7 This will typically be the case when the
precaution at issue is somewhat obvious (so that expected develop-
ment costs are relatively low, see Figure I) or when the expected acci-
dent costs, absent a precaution, are relatively high (so that expected
individual benefits of precaution development are relatively high, see
Figure J). These circumstances are more likely to occur in connection
with acute workplace risks, such as unguarded blades or extremely
bright lights. Ironically, then, the case for moderate paternalism's
more activist governmental role is weaker with respect to acute, se-
vere, and obvious workplace safety risks.
By contrast, when, as in Figure K, the risk is more subtle (so that
expected accident costs, and thus the expected individual benefits of
precaution efforts, are relatively low)238 and the precaution is less ob-
vious (so that expected development costs are relatively high), individ-
235. See supra notes 169 to 174 and accompanying text.
236. But see infra text accompanying note 241 (noting possibility that government de-
velopment of precautions employers would privately develop may be optimal if it
were to reduce total development costs).
237. See supra subsection II.B.2.b.
238. The actual accident costs (and consequent benefits of precautionary measures)
may be relatively high, but as long as the expected costs of accidents (and benefits
of precautions) are low, the individual employer will be less inclined to expend
the resources required to develop a precaution. Thus, subtle but genuine work-
place safety risks, such as the ergonomic risk posed by repeated motions, may not
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ual employers will be less likely to engage in significant efforts to
develop precautions, and the case for a more activist role for the gov-
ernment in developing precautions will be stronger. These circum-
stances are most likely to occur in connection with risks such as the
ergonomic risk related to repetitive motions, where neither the likely
accident costs nor the available precautions are immediately obvi-
ous. 239 Moderate paternalism is thus more likely to be optimal when
the risk at issue is subtle and the precaution non-obvious.
But what about the column on the right of these graphs-total so-
cietal benefits? Are there instances when very high societal benefits
from developing precaution information may justify efforts by the gov-
ernment to develop such information, even though circumstances are
such that private employers would do so without government assis-
tance (i.e., even though the situation resembles that represented in
Figures I or J)? Perhaps, but such situations will be rare. As noted
above, individual employers, who, unlike centralized regulators, are
privy to the time- and space-specific information necessary to formu-
late cost-effective precautions for their particular workplaces, typi-
cally possess a comparative advantage in precaution development.2 4o
Accordingly, the government should generally refrain from research
and development of workplace precautions whenever private employ-
ers are sufficiently motivated to undertake such efforts on their
own. 2 4 1 However, the fact that information is a public good that can
be consumed without being depleted suggests that, even if individual
employers would likely develop precaution information on their own,
it might make sense for the government to take the lead in doing so in
order to limit the total societal effort expended in producing the infor-
mation. After all, if precaution information can be shared (and if pri-
vate sharing of such information is unlikely), then a regime relying on
each employer's separate development of the information would in-
receive adequate attention from individual employers, even though the risks
posed are quite grave.
239. Safety risks related to repetitive motions (and thus the expected cost-savings
from developing precautions) are neither obvious nor, given the latency period for
most ergonomic injuries, acute. The discovery of design changes that can reduce
the injuries associated with repetitive stresses has taken significant effort, and
few individual employers likely stand to gain enough from developing ergonomic
precautions to undertake the efforts to do so. These facts may explain why em-
ployers have not voluntarily engaged in programs to reduce ergonomic injuries,
despite the fact that such injuries cost employers billions of dollars per year and
can be reduced relatively cheaply. See 64 Fed. Reg. 65768-69 (Nov. 23, 1999)
(noting that employers pay more than $15-20 billion in workers' compensation for
musculoskeletal disorders every year, that the other expenses associated with
those disorders may increase employers' total costs to $45-50 billion per year, and
that the workplace changes required by OSHA's proposed ergonomics standard
would save employers $9.1 billion per year).
240. See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying note 236.
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volve wasteful duplication of research and development efforts. Of
course, as the "shareability" of precaution information decreases (be-
cause the precautions are not transferable across a wide variety of
workplaces), the case for government development efforts is weak-
ened. Moreover, the precautions that are readily transferable across
workplaces likely will be the obvious precautions that require little
development effort in any event. If that is so, then government devel-
opment of such precautions likely will not be optimal, for the sum of
government development costs plus the costs of disseminating the in-
formation to employers will likely exceed the sum of private develop-
ment costs. Thus, there probably will be few cases in which it would
be more efficient for the government to develop the precautions that
private employers would develop on their own.
b. Vis-et-vis Pure Paternalism
Are there ever situations in which a pure paternalist, command-
and-control regime will be superior to a more flexible, moderate pater-
nalist regime? In theory, yes. But such situations are likely to be ex-
ceedingly rare, and policymakers should therefore narrowly constrain
the scope of pure paternalism, perhaps by employing a "dual-track"
regulatory regime in which command-and-control applies only in
those labor markets in which a moderate paternalist approach is
likely to fail. Once again, the relevant question for determining
whether a move from moderate to pure paternalism is justified in-
volves a balancing of incremental costs and benefits: Are the marginal
costs of mandating particular precaution technologies, rather than
merely recommending them, outweighed by the marginal benefits of
making such technologies mandatory?24 2
Mandating precaution technologies will almost never be justified
on grounds that the marginal costs of requiring particular precau-
tions, as opposed to recommending them, are low. That is because
when the marginal costs of moving from recommendations to com-
mands are low, the marginal benefits of doing so will generally be
even lower. To see this point, consider that the marginal cost of man-
dating a precaution technology, rather than merely recommending it,
decreases as the likelihood increases that the technology is one for
which fully informed employers and employees would voluntarily con-
tract.2 43 But, of course, the more universally appealing a precaution
242. Regulatory stringency involves the sort of increasing marginal costs and decreas-
ing marginal benefits represented in Figure A, supra. See supra notes 106-108
and accompanying text. Efficiency is maximized at the point at which the margi-
nal cost of a unit of regulatory restrictiveness equals the marginal benefit
thereof. See infra Figure A.
243. More specifically, the marginal costs of moving from an approach that encourages
but does not inflexibly require particular precautions to pure paternalism's com-
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is, the more likely it is to be adopted voluntarily so that nothing will
be gained by mandating it (i.e., there will be no marginal benefit asso-
ciated with requiring, rather than recommending, the precaution).
Thus, it is highly unlikely that a move to pure paternalism could ever
be justified on grounds that making such a move involves low margi-
nal costs.
If pure paternalism is ever justified, then, it will be because of the
high marginal benefits of mandating, rather than merely recom-
mending, particular precaution technologies. Those marginal benefits
will increase as the likelihood rises that moderate paternalism will
not achieve its ultimate objective of inducing employers to take all
cost-effective safety precautions.244 Thus, the less likely it is that (1)
providing employees with relative risk information will lead them to
demand accurate risk premiums, and (2) providing employers with in-
formation about available cost-effective precautions will lead them to
adopt such precautions voluntarily, the stronger the case for pure pa-
ternalism becomes. Assessing the benefits of a move to pure paternal-
ism therefore requires consideration of the circumstances in which
risk disclosure is unlikely to lead to risk premiums and employer edu-
cation efforts are unlikely to lead motivated employers to take cost-
effective precautions.
So when will employees fail to demand risk premiums despite be-
ing informed of relative risks? Recall from the discussion above that
not every employee needs to be aware of, or influenced by, relative risk
information in order for such information to generate risk premiums
and thereby motivate employers to take all cost-effective precautions
to reduce safety risks. Instead, the existence and size of risk premi-
ums will be determined according to the demands of marginal employ-
ees-those last employees the employer needs to hire in order to
mand-and-control regime will tend to be lower when: (1) the regulated risk is not
one for which there is great variation among employees' tolerances and employ-
ers' reduction costs (so that inflexibility will not thwart gains from trade); (2) the
potential safety hazard is not significantly magnified by employee carelessness
(so that it is not more efficient to allow the risk to remain and enlist employees in
preventing accidents); (3) the cost-effectiveness of the precaution is relatively in-
dependent of time- and place-specific concerns (so that the costs of crafting a gen-
erally applicable regulatory command are not too great); (4) there is little need to
encourage innovation of precaution technologies (because the precaution being
mandated is clearly the most cost-effective precaution that could be developed);
and (5) there is little chance that incumbent firms will seek to co-opt the regula-
tory process by seeking to procure regulatory mandates that create barriers to
entry. See supra notes 14-18, 164-176, and accompanying text. In short, the
marginal costs of moving to command-and-control are lowest when the precau-
tion technology to be prescribed is one that almost all fully informed employees
and employers would voluntarily contract for.
244. Recall that the "symptom" to be addressed in the workplace safety arena is em-
ployers' failure to take all cost-effective precautions. See supra Section II.A.
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operate at her chosen capacity. 24 5 Where wage discrimination is im-
practicable, as will likely be the case for most jobs posing safety risks,
the infra-marginal employees may free ride off the demands of the
marginal employees and will thereby be protected by their negotiating
efforts.
But all this assumes that the marginal employees will be effective
"deputies" who will successfully demand risk premiums on behalf of
themselves (and, because of the impracticability of wage discrimina-
tion, on behalf of their co-workers). To be effective deputies that could
generate risk premiums, the marginal employees would have to be (1)
aware of the relative risk information (i.e., they could not be "non-
searchers," to use the terminology of the search equilibrium model),246
and (2) somewhat representative in their tastes for risk (i.e., they
could not be anomalous risk-preferrers, who would not demand risk
premiums).247 If conditions of supply in demand in the labor market
are such that an employer is able to avoid hiring a critical mass of
employees that meet these criteria, then disclosing relative risks may
not result in internalization of safety risks, and employers therefore
may not be properly motivated to take all cost-effective precautions to
reduce such risks.
An employer could fulfill all her labor requirements without hiring
employees that will demand representative risk premiums if she were
able to hire exclusively: (1) risk-preferring employees, who would not
demand a risk premium; (2) non-searchers (i.e., employees that would
not pay attention to the relative risk information and thus would not
demand a risk premium); or (3) a combination of non-searchers and
risk-preferring searchers. In each of these cases, the employer could
avoid paying adequate risk premiums and therefore would not be mo-
tivated to take all cost-effective precautions.
In actuality, there is probably little reason to worry about any of
these hypothetical labor markets. With respect to the first-the one
in which the employer is able to fulfill all her requirements using risk-
preferring employees-the employer's failure to be motivated to take
optimal safety precautions presents little concern, for what is an "opti-
mal" level of risk ultimately depends on the risk preferences of the
employees. If all of an employer's employees prefer risk and make an
informed decision to accept a risky job without demanding a risk pre-
245. See supra notes 125-130, 209-211, and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
247. As explained above, though, even risk-preferring employees may still demand
risk premiums if given objective information about the relative risks of their
workplaces. That is because the employees would know that their employer
could not tell they were risk-preferring and would therefore probably be respon-
sive to a demand for increased pay based on relatively high safety risks. See
supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
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mium, 248 then requiring the employer to expend resources to reduce
risks would be sub-optimal. Of course, this assumes an absence of
third-party effects stemming from the employees' risk-taking deci-
sions.2 49 The existence of such effects-e.g., psychic costs to the em-
ployee's loved ones or increased costs to the government of having to
support an injured employee-may present a reason to worry about
labor markets in which employers are able to fulfill their require-
ments using solely risk-preferring employees.25o
The second and third hypothetical labor markets-the ones in
which the employer is able to fulfill her requirements by hiring only
non-searchers or a combination of non-searchers and risk-preferring
searchers-likely does not present a problem because such markets
likely do not exist. Providing relative risk information, presented in
the easily understood format discussed above, 2 5 1 to each prospective
and current employee will greatly limit the number of non-searchers,
so it would be quite difficult for any employer to fulfill her labor re-
quirements by hiring only individuals who remain ignorant of the rel-
ative risks of the employer's workplace. Moreover, the employer likely
could not hire only non-searchers and risk-preferring searchers, for
most searchers will also be risk-averse (otherwise, why would they be
searchers?). As long as it is necessary for an employer to hire a critical
mass of searching, risk-averse employees, then she will have to pay
risk premiums (on which the other employees may free-ride) and will
therefore have an incentive to take all cost-effective precautions.2 52
In any event, to the extent there were concerns that one of these
hypothetical labor markets might exist so that risks were not being
internalized to employers via marginal employees' demands for risk
premiums, the proper policy response would not be across-the-board
imposition of a pure paternalist, command-and-control regime. A less
restrictive, more efficient regulatory solution would be to impose com-
mand-and-control only in those labor markets in which there was
cause for concern. For example, particular precaution technologies
might be mandatory in geographic regions with high unemployment
rates (i.e., labor buyers' markets, in which employers might be able to
avoid hiring marginal employees who would demand risk premiums),
248. Even risk-preferrers are likely to demand a risk premium of some sort (because
they know that, as long as their employer cannot identify them as risk-preferrers,
they can credibly threaten to leave if not paid such a premium). See supra notes
212-216 and accompanying text.
249. Third-party effects are frequently cited as a justification for what initially appear
to be purely paternalistic regulations. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 103, at 455 &
n.154.
250. See Viscusi, supra note 20, at 79 (acknowledging possible third-party effects).
251. See supra notes 137-158 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 125-128, 209-211, and accompanying text.
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but merely recommended-through, say, "opt-out" regulations 2 5 3-
elsewhere. 2 54 This sort of dual-track regulatory approach would, in
Professor Breyer's words, "urge the adoption of classical regulatory
methods only where less restrictive methods will not work."255
The discussion so far has focused on situations in which an infor-
mational approach may not address the employer motivation hurdle to
optimal precaution-taking. But what about the employer knowledge
hurdle?25 6 In situations in which the precaution information to be
conveyed is abstruse or the recipient employers are particularly skep-
tical of government "advice" due to a history of antagonism with regu-
lators, educating employers about available cost-effective precautions
may be somewhat difficult. One might therefore think that mandat-
ing particular precautions, rather than merely recommending them,
could be appropriate in those situations.
It is doubtful, however, that the challenges involved in communi-
cating precaution information could justify imposition of a purely pa-
ternalist, command-and-control regime. Most of the difficulties
related to communicating precaution information to employers could
be overcome by selecting an appropriate means of disseminating pre-
caution information. 2 57 For example, promulgating an opt-out regula-
tion would provide an employer with a strong incentive to carefully
consider the recommended precaution technology. Given that an opt-
out regulation is mandatory unless the employer notifies her employ-
ees of the hazard addressed by the regulation, the nature of the pre-
caution the rule would mandate, and the fact that the employer is
opting out of compliance with the rule, 258 an employer confronted
with an opt-out regulation could not simply ignore the precaution at
issue. She would have to either implement it or, at the very least,
253. See supra text accompanying notes 230-232.
254. For example, OSHA might adopt an overarching rule that its safety regulations
would be opt-out regulations unless the county unemployment rate were to fall
below x%, in which case the regulations would be mandatory.
255. BREYER, supra note 1, at 185.
256. Employers may fail to be motivated to engage in optimal precaution-taking if
employees are systematically underinformed regarding the relative risks of the
workplace and therefore fail to demand adequate risk premiums. But even if
properly motivated to do so, employers may fail to take all cost-effective precau-
tions if they are systematically underinformed regarding the availability of such
precautions. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
257. As explained in subsection III.C.1 supra, there are a number of ways for the gov-
ernment to provide precaution information to employers: it could (1) engage in
simple research and development and allow employers to access a centralized
database of information regarding available precautions, (2) directly disseminate
the information to employers, (3) disseminate the information along with some
sort incentive for employers to take account of the information, or (4) impose pre-
sumptively mandatory "opt-out" regulations. See supra notes 221-232 and ac-
companying text.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 230-232.
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study it enough to describe it to her employees (and, most likely, offer
an explanation as to why it was not worth adopting given the circum-
stances at hand). It appears, then, that moderate paternalism pro-
vides means for overcoming the challenges related to communicating
precaution information to employers. 25 9 Accordingly, a move to a
purely paternalist, command-and-control regime likely cannot be jus-
tified on grounds that it is difficult to communicate precaution infor-
mation to employers.
In sum, the regulatory status quo, pure paternalism, is rarely jus-
tified. It cannot be justified on grounds that it costs little to imple-
ment relative to moderate paternalism, for the circumstances in which
it will impose low costs-situations in which the mandated precaution
is one that would be voluntarily chosen by fully informed employers
and employees-are precisely the circumstances in which it is least
needed. Nor can it be justified on the ground that informing employ-
ers of available cost-effective precautions is too difficult. If it is to be
justified, then, it will be because conditions of supply and demand in
the labor market preclude risk disclosure from generating adequate
risk premiums. Pure paternalism, then, should be limited to "labor
buyers' markets," in which there is a glut of available workers relative
to available jobs. A dual-track regulatory scheme imposing pure pa-
ternalism only where the unemployment rate exceeds a certain per-
centage would ensure that the high costs of command-and-control are
not incurred unnecessarily.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given that the current command-and-control approach to work-
place safety regulation appears to cost about three times more than it
provides in benefits,260 it is time for efficiency-minded policy makers
ask whether the current regulatory paradigm is an incidence of regu-
latory mismatch. They should follow Justice Breyer's "simple axiom
for creating and implementing any [regulatory] program: determine
the objectives, examine the alternative methods of obtaining these
objectives, and choose the best method for doing so."261 This Article
has sought to do just that.
The exploration presented here has revealed that there likely is a
cheaper, more-effective way to induce efficient precaution-taking in
the workplace. That alternative approach-a middle-ground between
the OSHA abolitionists' exclusive reliance on market processes and
the tort system (i.e., pure libertarianism) 262 and the command-and-
259. Another moderate paternalist option would be the "information plus incentive"
option discussed above. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
262. See Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19, at 1.
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control status quo defended by the OSHA apologists (i.e., pure pater-
nalism)263-would focus directly on the market failure leading to sub-
optimal precaution-taking in the workplace: systematically inade-
quate information concerning relative risks and, in some situations,
available precautions. By ensuring that employees are informed of
workplace risks, it would harness the market-based incentives created
by compensating differentials-incentives that literally dwarf the reg-
ulatory incentives created by OSHA's costly command-and-control re-
gime. 264 And, when circumstances are such that employers are likely
to be systematically under-informed of available cost-effective precau-
tions, the middle-ground approach would address that informational
deficiency as well. Only in highly unusual labor markets would the
middle-ground approach resort to the command-and-control status
quo.2 6 5 It would therefore narrowly address the particular market
failures at issue in the workplace safety arena and would avoid the
regulatory mismatch of which Justice Breyer warned.
263. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 54, at 22; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 96, at
729; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 96; Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at
311.
264. In 1993, employers paid an estimated $200 billion in compensating differentials,
while OSHA and its counterpart state agencies levied fines of just $160 million.
See Kneiser & Leeth, supra note 19, at 55. The incentive effects of compensating
differentials therefore outweigh those of OSHA's command-and-control approach
by a factor of 1250 to one!
265. See supra notes 246 to 253 and accompanying text.
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y x z Risk Reduction
x = socially optimal level of risk reduction.
y = too little risk reduction.
z = too much risk reduction.
Figure B: Decision Calculus Facing an Employee Considering
Whether to Engage Production of Risk Information
Costs of Info. Individual Benefits Total Benefits of
Production of Info. Production Info. Production
Because Costs > Individual Benefits, employee will not produce
info. even though magnitude of Total Benefits justifies costs.
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Figure C: How the Positive Externalities Associated With
Workplace Risk Information Leads to its Underproduction
Indiv. Marginal Total Marginal
Benefit Benefit
X, * Marginal Cost
x y Research Efforts
y = socially optimal level of research into risks
x = level of risk research that will occur privately, given the
divergence of private and total marginal benefits of research efforts
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kWh/year (kilowatt-hours per year) is a measure of energy (electricity) use.
odred Your utlty company uses it to compute your bill. Only models with 22.5 and 24.4
cubic feet and the above features are used in this scale.
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Refrigerators using more energy cost more to operate. Aa
This model's estimated yearly operating cost is: Bol
Box:U 424 pt. tall
Based on a 2000 U.S. Government national average cost of 8.030 per kWh for elecicity. Your
actual operating cost wil vary depending on your local utiity rates and your use of the product.
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Figure F: 2001 Injury / Illness Incidence Rates For Sausage
Manufacturers With Between 250 And 999 Employees
1st Quartile: Median: 3rd Quartile:
One-quarter of One-half of Three-fourths of
establishments establishments establishments
had a rate lower had a rate lower had a rate lower
than or equal to: than or equal to: than or equal to:
Total injuries/ 8.4 12.0 17.0
illnesses
Lost-workday 5.2 7.2 11.3
injuries/illnesses 5 7 11.
Figure G: 2001 Injury / Illness Incidence Rates For "Food And
Kindred Products" Manufacturers With Between 250
And 999 Employees
1st Quartile: Median: 3rd Quartile:
One-quarter of One-half of Three-fourths of
establishments establishments establishments
had a rate lower had a rate lower had a rate lower
than or equal to: than or equal to: than or equal to:
Total injuries/ 7.7 10.5 14.9
illnesses




Figure H: Comparative Risk Disclosure Form for Capitol Hill
Sausage Company
CAPITOL HILL'S INJURY/ILLNESS RATE COMPARED TO
SIMILARLY-SIZED SAUSAGE MANUFACTURERS
Least Risky 8.4 12.0 17.0 Riskiest






Figure I: Obvious Precaution
Expected Expected Total Benefits of
Costs of Info. Individual Benefits Info. Production
Production of Info. Production
Even though Expected Individual Benefits are
relatively low, they exceed Expected Costs of Info.
Production, so employers will develop precautions.
Figure J: Obvious/Acute Risks, High Expected Accident Costs
Expected Expected Total Benefits of
Costs of Info. Individual Benefits Info. Production
Production of Info. Production
Even though Expected Costs of Info. Production are relatively
high, they are exceeded by Expected Individual Benefits of
Information Production, so employers will develop precautions.
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Expected Total Benefits of
Individual Benefits Info. Production
of Info. Production
2004]
Where Expected Costs of Info. Production > Expected
Individual Benefits, employer will not produce info.
even though magnitude of Total Benefits justifies costs.
